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ABSTRACT 
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2003 
 
Supervising Professor: Maria Lúcia Milléo Martins 
 
 
 
 This thesis examines the 20th-century debate over one of the central topics in literary 
criticism. Despite persuasive counter-arguments, intentionality – the notion that the 
meaning of a literary work is what its author intended to say – continues to exercise its 
influence over many critics and readers. Here, the debate over intentionality is seen as more 
fundamentally a disagreement over the meaning of the word ‘meaning.’ The main 
theoretical paradigms employed represent each of the three sources or ‘poles’ of meaning: 
author (E.D. Hirsch), text (William K. Wimsatt and Monroe C. Beardsley) and reader 
(Stanley Fish). This examination proceeds in the context of two literary works which 
dramatize the quest for an author’s intention: Henry James’s tale “The Figure in the Carpet” 
(1896) and James Tate’s poem “The Figure in the Carpet” (1997). Through detailed 
analyses of these two works, some of the ramifications of the three theories of meaning are 
considered and their concomitant interpretive methodologies critiqued. 
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RESUMO 
 
 
 
 
Esta dissertação investiga o debate do século XX sobre um dos assuntos principais 
em crítica literária. Apesar dos contra-argumentos persuasivos, intencionalidade – a noção 
de que o significado de uma obra literária é a intenção do autor – continua a influenciar 
vários críticos e leitores. Nesta dissertação o debate sobre intencionalidade é visto na sua 
essência como uma discordância sobre o significado da palavra ‘significado.’ Os principais 
paradigmas teoréticos usados correspondem às três fontes ou ‘pólos’ de significado: autor 
(E.D. Hirsch), texto (William K. Wimsatt and Monroe C. Beardsley) e leitor (Stanley Fish). 
Esta investigação situa-se no contexto de duas obras literárias que dramatizam a busca pela 
intenção do autor: o conto de Henry James “The Figure in the Carpet” (“A Figura no 
Tapete”, 1896), e o poema de James Tate “The Figure in the Carpet” (1997). Através de 
análises detalhadas destas obras, algumas das ramificações das três teorias de significado 
são discutidas e as concomitantes metodologias interpretativas são avaliadas.  
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AUTHORIAL INTENTION  AND THE THREE POLES OF MEANING 
By Way of an Introduction 
 
Suppose you and I bump into each other in the street one morning. We shake hands 
and make a little small talk, during which I say, “I am going to town today.” What is the 
meaning of my sentence? More importantly, how did you decide on the meaning? Most 
likely you did not decide anything at all: you simply heard what I said, and understood the 
meaning as you did so. But suppose I had said “I am going to down today.” What is the 
meaning of this sentence? Is “down” the name of some new restaurant that just opened up, 
is it an acronym for some governmental department? Is it the latest dance craze or a new 
sport I never heard of? Is it something I am going to do today, or something I am going to 
do to today? Because the meaning of my sentence is unclear, several other meanings may 
cross your mind. Finally you will probably ask me to clarify myself, and I will tell you that 
yes, “down” is a restaurant where I am meeting a friend for lunch. It opened across the 
street from “up” just a few days ago. 
While this kind of interpretive difficulty is easily resolved in conversation, it is not 
so easily resolved in a work of literature.1 If a poem begins “I am going to down today” the 
reader does not have the option of asking the poet what she meant.2 How is the reader to 
determine the meaning of such a line? This question is at the heart of one of the 
fundamental and most problematic topics in literary criticism. The matter of authorial 
intention – what the author intended to say – became a major point of controversy in the 
twentieth century as critics debated whether or not it should be a factor in interpreting and 
evaluating a literary work. While intentionalist critics believed that the meaning of a 
literary work could only be what its author meant, anti-intentionalists argued that the author 
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could not and should not be asked what she meant, and thus that the meaning could only be 
what she had succeeded in saying. It has proved impossible for any critic to remain neutral 
in this debate. Authorial intention pertains to all works of literature, and the critic must 
clarify her position before she proposes any interpretations or ventures any solutions to 
theoretical problems. “There is hardly a problem of literary criticism in which the critic’s 
approach will not be qualified by his view of ‘intention’” (IF 334).  
But authorial intention is not merely a theoretical matter, restricted to the rarefied 
atmosphere of scholarly journals and graduate seminars. It has serious practical 
implications on literary education at all levels. If the author’s intention cannot be 
ascertained, on whose authority does the professor of literature profess the meaning of the 
work? And why should a student prefer the professor’s interpretation to her own? Authorial 
intention also has serious implications for the general reader. In many cases, reading is not 
a self-conscious process of deciding what the author meant. We do not ask ourselves what 
the author meant to say, because we assume that we already know: as in the case with “I am 
going to town today,” what the author meant to say is obvious. But not all literary meaning 
is as obvious as “I am going to town today.” If we cannot determine the meaning of a 
literary work by ourselves, how are we going to make sense of it, why should we bother 
reading it in the first place? How are we to discover the author’s intention, if the author has 
been dead for three hundred years? What is an intention, anyway? Is it a specific message 
the author wanted to communicate, something like “life is beautiful” or “war is bad”? If so, 
why didn’t the author simply tell us instead of making us guess? If you and I disagree over 
the meaning of a literary work, whose interpretation is correct, and on what grounds do we 
say that it is correct? In short, who decides what the meaning of a literary work is? 
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These questions might not be so difficult to resolve if we were able to agree on a 
definition of the word ‘meaning.’ As the critical literature suggests, the debate over 
authorial intention is more importantly a debate over a word whose meaning everybody 
understands but nobody agrees on. On one hand, it seems reasonable enough to equate 
meaning with the author’s intention: even on the morphemic level the meaning of the 
literary work seems inextricably linked to what the author means to say when she writes it. 
But even a one-volume college dictionary provides more possible definitions than this: 
‘meaning’ can include (a) “the thing one intends to convey”, or purport; (b) “the thing that 
is conveyed”, or import; and (c) a “significant quality”, especially an “implication of a 
hidden or special significance” (Webster’s 712). Critical theories are to a large extent 
characterized by the definition they propose for ‘meaning,’ and “divide easily, if roughly, 
according to their emphasis on work, author, or reader” (Booth 39). In other words, a 
particular critic will hold either that meaning is an inherent property of the work, that it is 
what the author intended (purport), or that it is what the reader understands (import). Let us 
examine the work of the leading proponents of each of these three sources or ‘poles’ of 
meaning. 
The Work. In the early decades of the twentieth century some of the most eminent 
critics in the English-speaking world launched an attack on the then-prevalent Romantic 
strain of criticism which viewed the literary work as an expression of the author’s 
personality. In “Tradition and the Individual Talent” (1919) T.S. Eliot argues that poetry “is 
not the expression of personality, but an escape from personality” (Essays 10). The poet’s 
job is not to assert her difference from previous poets, but to conform to a poetic tradition, 
which in turn rearranges itself to include the new poet’s contributions into a cohesive 
whole. The poet does not express emotions, but painstakingly constructs them by 
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combining words, phrases and images which evoke particular “feelings” (8). The reader 
thus experiences an emotion “which has its life in the poem and not in the history of the 
poet” (11). Eliot’s demands of the poet were echoed a decade later by I.A. Richards’s 
demands of the critic. In Practical Criticism (1929) Richards outlines a critical 
methodology which divorces the poem from biographical considerations. He presents the 
results of a classroom experiment in which, in order to maximize the objectivity of literary 
judgments, students were asked to comment on poems whose authorship and dates of 
composition had been excised. The results are frequently comic, less for the extreme 
variance and frequent pettiness of the students’ responses than for Richards’s arrogant 
derision of them. 
These authors laid the groundwork for the movement in Anglo-American letters 
which came to be known as the New Criticism, a cornerstone of which is William K. 
Wimsatt and Monroe C. Beardsley’s “The Intentional Fallacy” (1946). The classic 
statement of the anti-intentionalist position, this essay proposes “the poem itself” (IF 334) 
as an objective, self-contained entity, a “verbal icon”3 which is “detached from the author at 
birth and goes about the world beyond his power to intend about it or control it” (335). The 
authors do not propose a definition of meaning but rather tell us how meaning is to be 
ascertained: through internal evidence, “through the semantics and syntax of a poem, 
through our habitual knowledge of the language, through grammars, dictionaries, and all 
the literature which is the source of dictionaries” (339). It is not to be ascertained through 
external evidence – “revelations (in journals, for example, or letters or reported 
conversations) about how or why the poet wrote the poem” (339). Some gray area exists 
between the two kinds of evidence, and the authors allow for the use of biographical 
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evidence which, “while it may be evidence of what the author intended ... may also be 
evidence of the meaning of his words and the dramatic character of his utterance” (339).  
The fact that they do not propose a definition of meaning leads us to conclude that, 
for Wimsatt and Beardsley, the definition goes without saying. The claim implicit in “The 
Intentional Fallacy” is that an appropriately “objective criticism” (336) will produce the 
objective meaning of the work. It is not the meaning itself that is evaluated in Wimsatt and 
Beardsley’s model, but rather the poem’s effectiveness in producing it: “Judging a poem is 
like judging a pudding or a machine. One demands that it work” (335). For this reason the 
author’s declarations about his intention are unnecessary and not to be attended to: “How is 
[the critic] to find out what the poet tried to do? If the poet succeeded in doing it, then the 
poem itself shows what he was trying to do. And if the poet did not succeed, then the poem 
is not adequate evidence, and the critic must go outside the poem – for evidence of an 
intention that did not become effective in the poem” (334-5).  
The Author. The most comprehensive defense of the author’s intention was put 
forth by E.D. Hirsch in Validity in Interpretation (1967). Hirsch argues that the meaning of 
a literary work is precisely “what the author meant by his use of a particular sign sequence” 
(Validity 8), and that this meaning is both determinate (self-identical and unchanging) and 
reproducible (sharable). All relevant evidence, internal and external, may be used to 
determine the intention (197). Hirsch does not tell us what to do with express statements by 
the author about her intention, but this point would seem to be mooted by his limitation of 
meaning to verbal meaning: “whatever someone has willed to convey by a particular 
sequence of linguistic signs and which can be conveyed (shared) by means of those 
linguistic signs” (31). Even if the author did tell us, her intention would not count as the 
verbal meaning unless that intention could also be ascertained from the work alone. Despite 
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his ostensible opposition to their theory, in this respect Hirsch closely resembles Wimsatt 
and Beardsley: the author’s intention is to be sought, but only to the extent that it is 
evidenced by “the poem itself.” 
Hirsch’s theory also recalls Wimsatt and Beardsley’s in that his overarching aim is 
to demonstrate the feasibility of objectively valid interpretation. He rejects, however, the 
notion that “the poem itself” can serve as a normative standard for interpretation. The 
literary work does not have its own inherent meaning, as Wimsatt and Beardsley argued. 
Meaning is not in language but is “an affair of consciousness” (Validity 23): as almost any 
linguistic sequence can represent more than one meaning, a literary work “means nothing in 
particular until somebody either means something by it or understands something from it” 
(4). While “the poem itself” may be said to exist, insofar as it is a sequence of black marks 
on a page, the agency of an author or a reader is required to turn those marks into units of 
meaning. But it is utterly unfeasible to base a discipline of interpretation on something as 
variable as the reader’s understanding of a work. Even the best critics disagree about the 
meanings of works, and without some standard by which to discriminate between them the 
critic has no grounds on which to claim that her interpretation is better than the next. To 
posit a critic’s interpretation of the work as the ‘best’ meaning is simply to make that critic 
the author of the best meaning, and as Hirsch rightly asks, why should that critic be the 
author of the best meaning rather than the original author? Rejecting both the reader and 
“the poem itself” as the source of meaning, Hirsch proposes the author’s intention as “the 
only compelling normative principle” by which an interpretation may be judged as correct 
or incorrect (5). Hirsch allows that the meaning of a literary work can always be related to 
something else -- a historical or biographical context, the reader’s response, a critical 
discourse, and so forth. This relationship between the meaning and something else is the 
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work’s significance (8). While a discussion of significance is a legitimate aim of criticism, 
it must nevertheless be grounded in the correct interpretation of the author’s intention (57). 
A principal caveat of Hirsch’s argument is that it is directed toward situations in 
which “interpretation is conceived of as a corporate enterprise” (Validity 25). Unlike the 
textual editor, for example, who “owe[s] professional allegiance to the author’s original 
meaning” (89), the general reader, reading for pleasure in her bedroom, is not obliged to 
aspire to philological objectivity. Whether or not the general reader chooses to adopt the 
author’s intention depends upon the goal the reader sets for herself. Hirsch argues that, as 
literature has a vital communicative function, an ethical obligation to seek the author’s 
intention obtains even for the general reader; but he concedes that nothing in the nature of 
the text demands the adoption of the author’s intention as a normative standard.  
The Reader. In their continuing crusade in defense of “the poem itself,” Wimsatt 
and Beardsley published a second essay which targeted the attempt “to derive the standard 
of criticism from the psychological effects of the poem” (AF 401). In “The Affective 
Fallacy” (1948) they distinguish between what the poem is and what the poem does to its 
reader. This essay provided the catalyst for Stanley Fish’s rigorous advocacy of the role of 
the reader in the construction of literary meaning. In the volume of essays collected as Is 
There a Text in This Class? (1980), Fish argues that the focus of criticism should be 
precisely on what the poem does: “the reader’s response is not to the meaning; it is the 
meaning” (3). Fish’s theory begins as an argument against the New Critical conception of 
the literary work as a verbal icon, as a spatial entity rather than a temporal one. Meaning is 
not determined at the end of one’s reading of a text, when one has collected all the facts; 
reading occurs in time, and the variety of false starts, revisions, projections, and 
disappointed expectations which the reader experiences are not impediments to determining 
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the meaning but in fact constitute the meaning (26-7). Fish describes his methodology as 
“substituting for one question – what does this sentence mean? – another, more operational 
question – what does this sentence do?” (25).  
Like Hirsch, Fish challenges the New Critical notion that meaning is in the text:  
The category “in the text” is usually thought to refer to something that is irreducibly 
there independently of and prior to all interpretive activities ... [but in fact] what is 
perceived to be “in the text” is a function of interpretive activities, although these 
activities are performed at so primary a level that the shapes they yield seem to be 
there before we have done anything. (273-4) 
 
Even such an obvious formal feature as an abba rhyme scheme is not in the text until a 
reader looks for, and finds, an abba rhyme scheme. Once found, the rhyme scheme 
becomes a clear ‘fact’ of the text. But a reader who is more concerned with counting the 
number of vowels per line, or determining the ratio of passive to active constructions, may 
locate an entirely different set of ‘facts.’ The text has no existence prior to interpretation: it 
is the reader who brings the text into existence by deciding what she will look for and what 
will count as a ‘fact.’  
The chief argument against this theory is that it precipitates a state of interpretive 
anarchy, leaving readers free to construct whatever meanings they want. On these grounds 
no interpretation, no matter how ludicrous, could be dismissed as incorrect. As Fish argues, 
this fear is unwarranted. An interpretation is always constrained -- not by anything in the 
text, but by the conventions of an “interpretive community” to which the reader belongs:  
Interpretive communities are made up of those who share interpretive strategies not 
for reading (in the conventional sense) but for writing texts, for constituting their 
properties and assigning their intentions. In other words, these strategies exist prior 
to the act of reading and therefore determine the shape of what is read rather than, as 
is usually assumed, the other way around. (171)  
 
The text and the author’s intention are not objective entities but are in fact constructed by 
the reader. But the reader is not a free agent who can simply construct whatever texts and 
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intentions she wants; she is herself constructed by the interpretive community: “an 
individual’s assumptions and opinions are not “his own” in any sense that would give body 
to the fear of solipsism. That is, he is not their origin ... rather, it is their prior availability 
which delimits in advance the paths that his consciousness can possibly take” (320). The 
distinction between the three poles of meaning is, therefore, an illusion: “the entities that 
were once seen as competing for the right to constrain interpretation (text, reader, author) 
are now all seen to be the products of interpretation” (16-17).  
Fish’s theory of the interpretive community provides a functional account for both 
the similarities between interpretations and the differences between them. Within a given 
interpretive community, some meaning will always appear as obvious, as the literal 
meaning of the text, because it is the product of the strategies the interpretive community 
sets in place. A different interpretive community, approaching the text with a different set 
of strategies, will construct a different meaning which, to them, is just as obvious or literal. 
The text will always have a literal meaning, but the literal meaning may be different for 
every reader (268-92).  
The above theorists agree that the meaning of a text can only be determined with 
reference to a context, although they disagree as to what the proper context for that 
meaning is. For Wimsatt and Beardsley, the context is provided by the poem itself. The 
poem is a unified entity with a structural integrity, and thus the meaning of each part can 
only be determined with reference to the whole. At the same time, while it is independent 
of determinations by author and reader, the poem is not read in a vacuum. As their 
definition of “internal evidence” suggests, the poem itself is itself situated in a wider 
context which encompasses all of our linguistic and literary knowledge. For Hirsch, any 
correct guess about meaning can only follow from a correct guess about the type, or 
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intrinsic genre, of the utterance: “An individual trait [of an utterance] will be rootless and 
meaningless unless it is perceived as a component in a whole meaning, and this idea of the 
whole must be a more or less explicit guess about the kind of utterance being interpreted” 
(Validity 78). It is for this reason that Hirsch criticizes Richards’s methodology of removing 
dates and attributions before distributing poems to his students: all intentional evidence 
which helps the interpreter correctly assess the intrinsic genre is to be considered, as “All 
understanding of verbal meaning is necessarily genre-bound” (76). The reason that Fish 
insists that his theory of meaning will not result in interpretive anarchy is that an utterance 
never exists in isolation. The possibilities for interpretation are always constrained by the 
context of the utterance, and this context provides a norm for interpretation: “sentences 
emerge only in situations, and within these situations, the normative meaning of an 
utterance will always be obvious or at least accessible” (307). Unlike Hirsch, however, Fish 
insists that the determination of the context does not occur prior to the determination of 
meaning, but rather that the two occur simultaneously and through each other. 
Another point of agreement between these three theories of meaning is the 
stipulation that the meaning of a work is not reducible to a paraphrase, to some easily-
articulated message or content. The New Critics, putting their emphasis on how the 
meaning of a poem is produced rather than on what that meaning is, hold that “the meaning 
of a poem is fuller than its paraphrasable idea ... the rhythms, the verbal texture, the 
associations of words, the atmosphere, all the elements, enter into the meaning” (Brooks 
and Warren, 473). For Hirsch, the word ‘meaning’ “embraces not only intentional objects 
but also the species of intentional acts which sponsor those intentional objects ... subjective 
feeling, tone, mood, and value, are constitutive of meaning in its fullest sense” (Aims 8). 
Fish claims that “the information an utterance gives, its message, is a constituent of, but 
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certainly not to be identified with, its meaning. It is the experience of an utterance – all of it 
and not anything that could be said about it ... that is its meaning” (32). 
 
By Way of a Conclusion 
 
Wimsatt and Beardsley performed a valuable service for literary criticism by 
arguing that the poem is a work of art and not a document of the poet’s beliefs or emotional 
state. The “poem itself” is to be seen as an objective entity independent of determinations 
by either the author or the reader. Unfortunately, no such thing exists. What the New Critics 
presumed to be objective entities were in fact nothing more than subjective interpretations. 
This much is suggested by the notion of judging the success of a poem on the grounds that 
it ‘works’: A poem succeeds “because all or most of what is said or implied is relevant; 
what is irrelevant has been excluded, like lumps from pudding and ‘bugs’ from machinery” 
(IF 335). To claim that a poem contains only the relevant elements necessitates something 
that those elements can be relevant to. Wimsatt and Beardsley propose “the poem itself” as 
that thing, but fail to see the tautology their reasoning produces: the poem itself contains 
only those elements relevant to the poem itself. In short, the poem succeeds because it 
successfully produces the meaning the critic finds in it. How could it do otherwise? 
Hirsch’s argument that the meaning of the literary work is what its author meant is, 
as he admits, ultimately a matter of choice, and there is little need to make a comprehensive 
rebuttal here. His argument is persuasive insofar as we are inclined to agree with his 
conclusion. My main complaint with it, worth mentioning here, is a matter of semantics. 
Hirsch’s theory may at first glance seem much more stodgy and hard-line than it in fact is, 
simply because he insists on using the word ‘meaning’ to designate the author’s intention. 
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To the extent that the author’s intention can be ascertained, it is not necessarily a thing that 
readers will care to think of as the meaning of a literary work. Hirsch provides a 
hypothetical example: “A poet intends in a four-line poem to convey a sense of desolation, 
but what he manages to convey to some readers is a sense that the sea is wet, to others that 
twilight is approaching” (Validity 12). According to Hirsch, the sense of desolation is 
nevertheless the meaning of the poem, because it is what the poet intended to convey. But 
to insist that the meaning of a work can be something which is not even successfully 
expressed is to treat the word ‘meaning’ very callously, and we are likely to reject Hirsch’s 
theory simply because it affronts our expectations of what the word ‘meaning’ should refer 
to. 4 The word ‘meaning’ functions very much like the word ‘love.’ Although it may be 
defined, it is impossible to define to everyone’s satisfaction. The word suggests a general 
category which always overflows whatever definition is assigned to it. It is difficult to 
imagine that any two people mean the same thing by it, and yet each person knows exactly 
what she means when she uses it. Moreover, one does not judge one’s love by someone 
else’s definition of the word.  
We saw above that one of the definitions my dictionary provided for ‘meaning’ was 
a “significant quality” (Webster’s 712). It is ironic that a definition for the word ‘meaning’ 
should be this vague, but it is an important definition, as it suggests a universally 
acknowledged and widely used sense of the word. We can perhaps lend a little precision by 
suggesting that ‘meaning’ in this sense is the value or importance of a particular object to a 
particular subject, what we might call the object’s meaningfulness. An example of this 
sense of the word can be found in Fish’s acknowledgments to Is There a Text in This 
Class?, where he writes that “Jane Parry Tompkins has encouraged me and inspired me and 
given meaning to everything in my life” (vii). The meaning of a work, in any of the three 
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definitions we have been examining, is less important than its meaningfulness to the reader. 
When we say that we find a poem meaningful we are not referring to the fact that the poet 
intended something by it, or to the fact that we understood something from it. We are 
referring to the fact that what we understood is extremely valuable to us, that we cherish it 
and consider ourselves in some way ennobled by it. 
As we can see, the battle for supremacy among the three poles of meaning is unduly 
complicated by the battle for possession of the word ‘meaning.’ In order for these theorists 
to use the word ‘meaning’ they must first define it as something, as by itself it means 
nothing very specific. The words they define it with, however (‘the poem itself,’ ‘the 
author’s intention,’ ‘the reader’s response’), have greater descriptive accuracy than the 
word they attempt to define. Fish suggests that the word should be eliminated, “since it 
carries with it the notion of message or point. The meaning of an utterance, I repeat, is its 
experience” (65). In doing this, he severs the word from one prescriptive definition only to 
attach it to another one. Obviously the word ‘meaning’ must mean something beyond what 
these theorists attempt to define it as, or they wouldn’t be in such a hurry to appropriate it 
for their own exclusive use. Through the ‘meaningfulness’ definition, the word ‘meaning’ 
acquires a certain cachet, which these theorists attempt to capitalize on by arguing for 
exclusive use of the word ‘meaning.’ Perhaps we should take Fish’s suggestion literally and 
abandon our usage of the word ‘meaning’ altogether. Instead of asking the question, “What 
is the meaning of this work?” we would ask, variously, “what was the author’s intention? 
What are the ‘irrefutable facts’ of the text? And what is my experience reading it?” While 
this does not resolve the theoretical controversy, it at least clarifies the terms of discussion. 
If the reader is to go tilting after windmills, she at least has a clearer understanding of 
which windmills she is tilting after.5  
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Fish’s reader-oriented approach seems to me both the most accurate and the most 
practical of the models outlined above, and I accept the majority of his conclusions in this 
thesis. I disagree with him on one point, however. Although his theory of the interpretive 
community would seem to suggest that all readings of a text are legitimate, in the sense that 
they are all literal readings, Fish argues that they are nevertheless expected to fall within 
certain conventional guidelines: “the activity of interpretation ... is determined by the 
literary institution which at any one time will authorize only a finite number of interpretive 
strategies” (342). We thus have a practical principle for excluding interpretations which do 
not defer to the authority of the literary institution: “The fact that [idiosyncratic 
interpretations] are ridiculous, or are at least perceived to be so, is evidence that we are 
never without canons of acceptability; we are always “right to rule out at least some 
readings”” (349).  
Where do these canons of acceptability come from? Are the strategies of the literary 
institution decided by its constituents, or are they presented to them as an inflexible norm to 
which their own strategies must defer? Although readers within the literary institution – 
students in a university literature classroom, for example -- may be expected to adhere to 
the authorized interpretive strategies, they do not necessarily do so. When a student enters 
the classroom, she is not simply an empty vessel waiting to be filled with strategies for 
interpreting texts. She has already passed through a great many interpretive communities 
and has acquired a variety of interpretive strategies. She is, so to speak, an ‘interpretive 
community of one’ whose set of strategies is a unique pastiche of all the strategies she has 
learned from all the interpretive communities to which she has belonged. Consequently, the 
readings she produces may strike her fellow students as idiosyncratic. The fact that an 
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idiosyncratic reading is ruled out makes it no less the literal meaning of the text for that 
student, and for good reason -- it is not the text that rules out such a reading.  
The student is thus forced to make a choice when she walks into the classroom: she 
has already understood the literal meaning of the text, and she must now either fight for her 
reading or re-interpret the text in accordance with the strategies authorized by the literary 
institution. What can be the purpose of re-interpreting the text, when she has already 
understood the literal meaning? One could argue that there is greater value in a shared 
meaning than in a merely private one, although I do not see why. The meaning of a text is 
always constructed privately, during the act of reading. Even when students read a text 
together in class, they still construct the meaning privately, although they may later 
collaborate in the construction of another meaning. This collaborative meaning may even 
be the more persuasive one, but the students would not have been able to collaborate in the 
first place had they not already privately constructed some meaning or other.  
At any rate, there is no de facto reason why either meaning should be better than the 
other. To privilege either one of these meanings presumes an implicit decision about the 
function of the text. Earlier I suggested that the disagreement over authorial intention is a 
manifestation of a more fundamental disagreement about the meaning of the literary work. 
In the same way, the disagreement about meaning is a manifestation of an even more 
fundamental disagreement about the function of the literary work. Despite over three 
thousand years of literary production, nobody has ever conclusively proven what a literary 
work is supposed to do. The disagreement over the function of literature is in fact a covert 
agenda in the three critical programs outlined above. While Wimsatt and Beardsley 
presume the poem as an object of strictly aesthetic appreciation (studying “the poem itself” 
is something like studying the aesthetic properties of a fork without mentioning that it can 
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also be used to eat with), Hirsch’s advocacy of the author’s intention implies the function of 
literature as a mode of communication (“when we fail to conjoin a man’s intentions to his 
words we lose the soul of speech, which is to convey meaning and to understand what is 
intended to be conveyed”; Aims 90), and Fish’s advocacy of the reader implies its function 
as an object which produces an effect which is itself significant. One reason why there is no 
agreement between these parties, I suggest, is quite simply because there is no need for one. 
To view the literary work as fulfilling one of these functions in no way prevents the reader 
from viewing it as fulfilling another function as well. If there is no consensus about the 
function of the work, there can be no consensus about its meaning, for how can the 
meaning of a work be determined without reference to its function? Among these 
conflicting theories the reader is left to decide. Just as the poem may serve several functions 
for the reader, its meaning may proceed from several sources. This would seem to create a 
conflict between the meanings of a poem only if those sources were seen as discrete 
entities, rather than, as Fish sees them, the products of a single act of interpretation. 
 
The Project, and Some More Conclusions 
 
If the matter of authorial intention is a problem for all theorists, critics, students, 
professors and readers of literature, it is no less a problem for the authors themselves. 
Confronted with a reading public which frequently fails to perceive their intended 
meanings, authors are forced to consider the relevance of their own intentions to the 
meaning of their works. In their earlier essay Wimsatt and Beardsley mention an extreme 
form of intentionality, “the way of biographical or genetic inquiry, in which, taking 
advantage of the fact that [the poet] is still alive, and in the spirit of a man who would settle 
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a bet, the critic writes to [the poet] and asks what he meant” (IF 344). Half a century before 
the appearance of Wimsatt and Beardsley’s essay, Henry James proffered his response to 
this very situation. In his tale “The Figure in the Carpet” (1896) an aging novelist invites a 
young critic to search for the “general intention” which runs through the entire body of his 
work (FC 369). Despite the extensive literature devoted to the topic since James’s time, the 
question of whether or not a literary work means what its author says it means continues to 
trouble us. In a poem by James Tate, also entitled “The Figure in the Carpet” (1997), a 
standoffish ‘author’ is harassed by the efforts of an overzealous ‘critic’ to discover “what is 
on our minds” (Shroud 59). To some extent a verse adaptation of James’s tale, Tate’s poem 
abstracts the search for intention in order to suggest a general hermeneutic compulsion, a 
need to establish authority for human existence and create order out of chaos. 
In this thesis I examine the issue of authorial intention and its relation to the 
meaning of the literary work. This examination proceeds through a discussion of the two 
‘versions’ of “The Figure in the Carpet” by James and Tate. My procedure has not been the 
customary scientific method of formulating a hypothesis, gathering data and reaching a 
conclusion. If there is any truth to Fish’s claims, all the data which would prove my 
hypothesis would only have come into view as a function of that hypothesis. My 
conclusions are therefore not located in a final chapter but are scattered throughout the 
thesis, which will perhaps best be read not as a linear argument, but rather in terms of 
thematic repetition and development. Rather than beginning with a hypothesis, I have 
begun with my beliefs, and my procedure has been to scrutinize these beliefs in a dialectical 
fashion in the hope of making them more sound. In the interest of clarity, let me declare 
some of these beliefs up front. 
 18 
This thesis is directed against any notion of ‘literary competence.’6 A theory of 
literary interpretation must deal with the meanings that actual readers make, not 
hypothetical ones. There is no body of knowledge prerequisite for a meaningful experience 
of literature: it has even been said that a reader with an attentive ear to the ottava rima may 
perceive much of the sense of The Divine Comedy, though she lacks any knowledge of 
Italian. Understanding is a primary goal of reading, and a reader cannot understand a work 
by using knowledge she has not acquired. A ten-year-old’s interpretation of a tale by James 
may seem reductive, trite or just plain wrong by my standards; but so may my 
interpretation seem trite by the standards of a professional critic, and so may that critic’s 
interpretation seem trite by the standards of the ten-year-old.  
Similarly, this thesis is directed against the notion that “the interpreter’s task should 
be to elucidate the potential meanings of a text, and not to restrict himself to just one” (Iser 
22). There is no limit to the potential meanings of a text, and a criticism which concerns 
itself with potential meanings, rather than the actual meanings that actual readers make, 
dooms itself to pointlessness. As far as I know, the goal of most readers is not how they can 
understand a text, but how they do understand it, and it is perhaps a more relevant goal for 
the critic to provide an accurate description of a single understanding, the literal meaning 
of the text. This sets no limitations on the potential meanings of a text. Readers will always 
continue to understand new meanings; but until they do, it seems fruitless to talk about 
them.  
Most importantly, this thesis is directed against any notion of objective meaning. No 
interpretive approach can offer any certainty that the objective meaning of the work has 
been reached: even Hirsch’s method aspires to no more than the “agreement that truth has 
probably been achieved” (Validity ix; my emphasis). We can, however, be certain that a 
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subjective meaning has been reached, and this would seem to be a more practical 
interpretive goal. In a discussion of visual perception, the philosopher of science Norwood 
Russell Hanson arrives at this very conclusion: 
It is always hazardous to argue from what is in one’s field of vision to what there is. 
But it is never hazardous to assert what it is that occupies one’s field of vision – 
indeed, in a queer sense of “wrong,” we could never be wrong in our reports of what 
occupies our field of vision. How could we misidentify the objects of our private 
experience? (73-4; my emphasis) 
 
We cannot know what exists; but we can know what we see. We cannot  know what a text 
means, but we can know what we understand the text to mean. The inevitable subjectivity 
of literary interpretation is a primary theme in this thesis. 
For Hirsch, the ultimate goal of literary interpretation is a consensus about the 
meaning of the work. Why is such a consensus necessary? Nothing in the nature of the 
literary work requires that its readers agree about what it means; many readers never even 
discuss their interpretations with anyone. The need for a consensus about the meaning of 
the literary work is only a function of a particular social group within which that meaning is 
being discussed, and before we bend over backwards for the sake of achieving a consensus 
we should first ask ourselves if there is any practical need for one. In private reading 
situations, in classrooms, and even in most critical situations, there is no practical need for a 
consensus; it is in fact the lack of a consensus that accounts for the thriving of literary 
criticism. Critical goals such as the attempt to “stop the endless debates among critics” 
(Rimmon xi) will hopefully never be realized.7  
My focus in the following chapters has not been on producing readings of the two 
versions of “The Figure in the Carpet” but rather on using those readings as a platform for a 
discussion of authorial intention. Whatever conclusions I arrive at are not intended as 
general recommendations but rather as stepping-stones in my personal development as a 
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reader. Whatever theoretical concepts I introduce are attempts to formalize my own 
understanding and are not meant as recommendations for understanding the works. This 
may seem like an unnecessary caveat to make, but it strikes me as worth making. My aim is 
not to persuade the reader that this is what the works objectively mean, but to describe my 
own subjective understanding as accurately as possible. That being said, I still argue for the 
validity of these readings as ‘traditional’ readings. This is particularly the case with my 
reading of James: my emphasis has been on aspects neglected by other critics and on 
rebutting those readings which I feel ‘miss the point’ of the tale (in the words of one of the 
characters, to tell the truths other critics “funked”). Chapter 1 begins with a brief history 
and analysis of the criticism attendant to James’s “The Figure in the Carpet”, followed by a 
reading of the tale itself. In my reading, I explore some of the ramifications of both the 
intentionalist and anti-intentionalist approaches by comparing the fates of the characters 
who search for the novelist’s intention. I explore these ramifications again in Chapter 2 
through an analysis of my own problematic attempt to make sense of Tate’s “The Figure in 
the Carpet”. In neither reading do I mean to suggest that the work implicitly attacks or 
defends any of the theoretical positions we have been discussing. My readings are the 
product of my theoretical perspective, and for this reason I have attempted to elucidate that 
perspective in this introduction. For a reader approaching these works from another 
perspective, my readings will not appear as an accurate description, and I can only quote 
the novelist in James’s tale when he says: “I do it in my way ... Go you and don’t do it in 
yours” (FC 369).8  
                                                 
1
 Except in specific instances, such as my discussion of Barthes in Chapter 2, the terms ‘literary work,’ 
‘work,’ ‘text’ and ‘poem’ should  henceforth be taken to refer to the same conceptual entity. As different 
authors give preference to one or another of these terms, I have tried to follow their usage. By the same token, 
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terms such as ‘poem’ and ‘novel’ are in most cases meant as hypothetical substitutions for the literary work in 
general. 
 
2
 Except where I refer to specific authors and characters, the feminine form of the third-person pronoun will 
be used throughout this thesis. 
 
3
 This phrase does not appear in the essay but is the title of the book in which “The Intentional Fallacy” was 
reprinted: William K. Wimsatt, Jr. The Verbal Icon: Studies in the Meaning of Poetry. Lexington: U of 
Kentucky P, 1954.  
 
4
 In a later work, The Aims of Interpretation (1976), Hirsch concedes that his earlier definition of meaning 
was too narrow, and redefines it as “that which a text is taken to represent. No normative limitations are 
imported into the definition, since under it, meaning is simply meaning-for-an-interpreter” (79). This 
definition, which refers to the same category as Fish’s ‘literal’ meaning, strikes me as the more useful. 
 
5
 However, as many of the authors discussed in this thesis do use the word ‘meaning,’ this is not the place to 
dispose of it altogether. At the very least clarity will be served by a consciousness of the various uses of the 
word, and where I employ it, I have tried to specify the sense in which it is intended. 
 
6
 The notion of literary competence, which owes itself largely to Noam Chomsky’s theory of linguistic 
competence, is frequently invoked when a critic means to refer to a body of knowledge deemed necessary for 
an adequate understanding of the literary work. One manifestation of it is the structuralist notion of the ideal 
reader, “who would have at his or her disposal all of the codes which would render [the literary work] 
exhaustively intelligible” (Eagleton 121). 
 
7
 Ironically, the works Rimmon discusses, including “The Turn of the Screw” and “The Figure in the Carpet”, 
owe their critical longevity precisely to these endless debates. 
 
8
 This injunction could be construed as ambiguous, but I do not intend any ambiguity in my usage of it here. 
Rather than negating the imperative “do it in yours,” I read the “don’t” simply as a rhetorical emphasis, so 
that the ‘final meaning’ of the sentence would be “Go you and do it in yours.”  
CHAPTER 1 
SEEING IS BELIEVING: THE SUBJECTIVITY OF LITERARY PERCEPTION 
 
The narrator of Henry James’s “The Figure in the Carpet” is a literary critic for a 
newspaper called The Middle. He writes a review of the latest novel by Hugh Vereker, and 
has the chance to win the novelist’s praise for his “acute little study” (FC 363) when he 
attends a party at which “the great man” is also present (359). Vereker, unaware that the 
narrator is the author, is unimpressed with the review, and dismisses it in front of the guests 
as “the usual twaddle” (362). Later in the evening, having learned of his identity, an 
apologetic Vereker takes the narrator aside and reveals a long-guarded secret: his novels are 
informed by a “general intention” (369), an “exquisite scheme” (366) which runs 
throughout his novels but which no one has ever discovered. To Vereker, this general 
intention is the very point of the novels, and the critics’ inability to perceive it has led him 
to doubt his worth as a novelist: “It’s quite with you rising young men,” he says, “that I feel 
most what a failure I am!” (365). The narrator, who suggests that it is “something like a 
complex figure in a Persian carpet” (374), resolves to find the general intention, and in a 
“maddening month” pores through Vereker’s novels (370). He finds only that “my new 
intelligence and vain preoccupation damaged my liking” (370), and concludes that “the 
general intention [was] a monstrous pose” (370). 
Vereker soon regrets having revealed his secret and asks the narrator not to repeat it. 
But the narrator has already repeated it: George Corvick, his editor at The Middle, has taken 
up the quest for the figure in the carpet. Vereker does not share the narrator’s belief that 
Corvick’s possession of the secret may “really lead to something” (FC 373), but he takes an 
interest in the fact that Corvick is joined in the quest by his fiancée, Gwendolen Erme. 
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“That may help them,” Vereker says, “but we must give them time!” (373). Corvick and 
Gwendolen indeed take their time, taking Vereker “page by page, as they would take one of 
the classics, inhal[ing] him in slow draughts” (375), but fail to find the figure. Corvick 
takes a job as a foreign correspondent and after six months in India sends Gwendolen a 
telegram announcing his discovery of the figure: “Eureka. Immense” (381). He rushes off 
to Italy where Vereker confirms the discovery as “not a note wrong” (383). Gwendolen 
writes him for news, but Corvick replies that he will only tell her the figure after they have 
married. The narrator also begs for news, but Corvick will only say that he has begun an 
“exhaustive study” which will reveal “the unimagined truth” about Vereker’s novels (387). 
A sick brother calls the narrator to Germany, and in his absence Corvick returns to England 
and is quickly married to Gwendolen. On their honeymoon, Corvick is killed while driving 
a dog-cart. His study of Vereker is left a “mere heartbreaking scrap” which does not reveal 
the figure in the carpet (389).  
One by one the doors slam shut on the narrator’s chances for enlightenment. He 
asks Gwendolen if Corvick revealed the figure to her before his death. “I heard everything,” 
she says, “and I mean to keep it to myself!” (FC 390). Vereker dies. Gwendolen marries a 
critic named Drayton Deane and dies giving birth to her second child. In a last-ditch 
attempt the narrator approaches Deane and desperately proposes to pay any price for the 
“information” he believes Deane is in possession of. But Deane knows nothing. As the 
narrator relays the story Deane’s curiosity mounts, and he too finds himself obsessed with 
the figure in the carpet. The two critics live out their days as fellow “victims of unappeased 
desire” (400). 
R.P. Blackmur has claimed that there is no body of literature “so eminently suited to 
criticism as the fiction of Henry James” (Art xv). Within that body of literature “The Figure 
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in the Carpet” seems particularly irresistible to literary critics. Its appeal is due to more than 
the simple fact that “literary critics like stories about literary critics” (Geismar 138): the tale 
offers the critic an opportunity to analyze not only the tale itself but also the tale’s subject 
matter -- the art and craft of literary criticism. As Hana Wirth-Nesher suggests, any critic’s 
interpretation of the tale will inevitably reflect that critic’s presumptions and conclusions 
about her own profession: 
The meaning of “The Figure in the Carpet” depends upon our notion of “meaning” 
and our concept of the relationship of literature and life. The more didactic our view 
of literature, the more we will see a real “figure” to be discovered in that carpet; the 
more autonomous we see the work of art, the more diffuse that figure becomes; the 
more sanctified the work of art, the less worthy the critics in the story of 
successfully finding it; and the more collective our concept of the creation of 
meaning, the larger that figure becomes, so that it takes on protean qualities, 
absorbing James’s intentions, critics’ interpretations, and the general question of 
morality and aesthetics. (125) 
 
The meaning of any work of literature, of course,  depends upon our notion of ‘meaning,’ 
but “The Figure in the Carpet” makes the point particularly well, precisely because the 
content of Vereker’s general intention is frequently presumed to refer to much more than 
simply the artistic intention of a fictional novelist. Evident in this passage, and in much of 
the criticism surveyed in this chapter, is a (possibly inadvertent) confusion between 
Vereker’s general intention and what is imagined to be James’s general intention. The 
search for a general intention in both works tends to be equated with the search for the 
meaning of those works, although at no point does Vereker refer to his intention as the 
meaning of his novels. This confusion between Vereker’s work and James’s is often so 
deeply entrenched that it is difficult to tell which work the critic is interpreting. James 
invites this confusion, of course, by inducing us to speculate about Vereker’s general 
intention, providing clues to its nature while simultaneously withholding its contents. The 
critic is thrust into the questionable position of trying to interpret a work she has not read 
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and which does not exist. Vereker’s oeuvre becomes a literary tabula rasa, a generic 
literary work which reflects the critic’s own theoretical orientation. Any ‘interpretation’ of 
that oeuvre is virtually the critic’s answer to the question of what literature in general 
means or can mean. It is thus no surprise that the tale has become the object of controversy. 
The published criticism has become a forum for the larger debate over the source of the 
meaning of the literary work. Because of the tale’s ability to accommodate contradictory 
interpretations, advocates of each of the three poles of meaning (text, author, reader) will 
find their spokespersons in James’s tale.  
According to Frank Kermode, the critics are unanimous in their opposition “to any 
deflatingly ‘referential’ explanation” of James’s tale (26). Richard A. Hocks finds “The 
Figure in the Carpet” to be a “dialectical inquiry into art and human relationships” which 
“thoroughly eludes any simple “aesthetic” interpretation” (53). For G.L. Hagberg the tale 
shows that “it is intrinsically futile to attempt to deliver the meaning of something as 
complicated, as lifelike, as a literary work” (148). Peter W. Lock claims that the tale is not 
“about anything: it is what it unfolds and it is what unfolds it” (167). It may be imagined 
that, like the narrator, critics only arrive at such conclusions after an arduous and frustrated 
attempt to discover the figure and thus ‘solve’ the tale. Blackmur’s failure to discover a 
figure leads him to conclude that “The Figure in the Carpet” means “no more than that 
there is a figure in the carpet if you can imagine it for yourself” (Blue 204). Blackmur here 
recalls Wirth-Nesher, but while for Wirth-Nesher the subjectivity of meaning is a strength 
in the tale, for Blackmur it is clearly a weakness.  
The most ambitious attempt to solve “The Figure in the Carpet” comes from 
Tzvetan Todorov, who “pick[s] up Vereker’s gauntlet” (144) and proceeds to search for the 
general intention behind sixteen of James’s tales. He finds that “The Jamesian narrative is 
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always based on the quest for an absolute and absent cause” (145). In “The Figure in the 
Carpet” the general intention is the absence which motivates the characters and causes the 
narrative (175). Todorov applies this principle not only to James’s work but to Vereker’s as 
well: Vereker’s secret  
resides precisely in the existence of a secret, of an absent and absolute cause, as well 
as in the effort to plumb this secret, to render the absent present. Vereker’s secret 
was therefore told to us, and this in the only way possible. If it had been named, it 
would no longer have existed, for it is precisely its existence which constitutes the 
secret. This secret is by definition inviolable, for it consists in its own existence. 
(175)  
 
Todorov soon sees that he has laid a trap for himself. He has, in fact, violated the inviolable 
secret: “If Henry James’s secret ... is precisely the existence of a secret, how does it come 
about that we can now name the secret, render absence present? Am I not thereby betraying 
the fundamental Jamesian precept which consists in this affirmation of absence, this 
impossibility of designating truth by its name?” (177). He concludes with a pyrrhic 
reformulation of his original hypothesis: criticism is “the search for truth, not its revelation 
... Once this “reading of James” is over, we must then begin reading James, set out upon a 
quest for the meaning of his oeuvre, though we know that this meaning is nothing other 
than the quest itself” (177). This conclusion illustrates the dangers of confusing James’s 
work with Vereker’s. Vereker’s secret is clearly more than “the quest itself”: “it’s naturally 
the thing for the critic to look for. It strikes me ... even as the thing for the critic to find” 
(FC 366). Vereker suggests that it can be named, and moreover has been named in his 
novels (367). Corvick apparently also names the figure. He communicates it both to 
Vereker and Gwendolen, and plans to reveal it in an article which will “utter ... the 
unimagined truth” about the novels (387).1 
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In his introduction to The Act of Reading, Wolfgang Iser makes a sustained attack 
on the attempt to reduce Vereker’s general intention to a referential meaning. Iser 
distinguishes between the two critics’ “totally different approaches to the fictional text” 
(10): meaning as object, represented by the narrator, and meaning as effect, represented by 
Corvick. The narrator searches for a meaning which is “precisely formulated on the printed 
page” (9) and can be subtracted from the text. This approach reduces the literary work to 
the status of a puzzle, and in solving that puzzle “there is nothing left for [the narrator] to 
do but to congratulate himself on this achievement” (4). Corvick, on the other hand, 
experiences Vereker’s figure as a powerful and ineffable effect. This experience changes 
his life, but “all he can do is report this extraordinary change – he cannot explain or convey 
the meaning as the [narrator] seeks to do” (10). Iser makes a strong case for the 
irreducibility of the figure to any referential meaning. But in insisting on the ineffability of 
Corvick’s experience, like Todorov he fails to account for the several occasions in the tale 
in which just such an experience is explained or conveyed. 
Some critics, rather than speculating about the nature of the figure, have focused 
their attention on the quest itself. A point of contention in the criticism is the matter of 
whether or not James is being ironic in his presentation of the efforts of the two critics. 
Does “The Figure in the Carpet” implicitly defend or indict the quest for Vereker’s 
intention? Lyall H. Powers finds Corvick and Gwendolen to be “ideal readers of Vereker’s 
works” (102). Others (Hocks 51-3; Matthiessen 42) see the tale as a critique of the 
obsessive and destructive pursuit of the figure. Fred Kaplan goes so far as to say that 
“James mocks both readers who look for secret meanings and authors who pretend that 
there are secret meanings” (412). And Maxwell Geismar underscores the chameleonic 
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nature of the tale when he suggests that it “can be used either as an argument for “close 
analytical appreciation” – or more likely against it” (139).  
For Geismar, it is more than James’s ironic intent which is ambiguous: the figure in 
the carpet may be a figment of the narrator’s imagination (137-8). This allegation is 
presumably grounded in the observation that the first-person narrator neither discovers the 
figure nor receives any proof that a figure has ever been discovered. Theories which claim 
either that the figure is a fraud or that it remains undiscovered mark a turning point in the 
criticism of “The Figure in the Carpet”, and provide the groundwork for Shlomith 
Rimmon’s influential study of ambiguity in James’s tale. For Rimmon, the figure neither 
exists nor does not exist: the tale is entirely ambiguous, allowing the reader no possibility 
of choice between the two interpretations. Rimmon defines narrative ambiguity as the 
conjunction of mutually exclusive “finalized” hypotheses, and distinguishes it from such 
other cognate phenomena as subjective interpretations, plurality, allegory, and double 
meaning (9-16). She provides a resume of interpretations of “The Figure in the Carpet” 
which is worthwhile quoting at length: 
The two contradictory hypotheses are a, “There is a figure in Vereker’s carpet”; ā, 
“There is no figure in Vereker’s carpet.” These propositions can be “realized” in 
various ways, and a whole network of a’s and b’s (based, of course, on the initial a 
and ā) can be formed. Each of these contraries has been proposed by critics as the 
best interpretation of the story. On the a side there are the following possibilities: 
(1) Corvick discovers the secret to Vereker’s satisfaction and transmits it to 
Gwendolen who, in turn, withholds it from her second husband; (2) the secret exists, 
but all the “Virgilian intelligences” in the story fail to unearth it for reasons that are 
either personal (incapacity to love) or professional (wrong way of dealing with 
literature) or both; (3) the characters do not discover the secret, but it is indirectly 
communicated to us by the texture of James’s story. On the ā side there is a similar 
divergence into contrary b’s: (1) Vereker “invented” the idea of the figure in order 
to impress the young critic (that is, Vereker lies); (2) Vereker is deluded about his 
own work; he believes it to contain a central ‘figure’, while in fact it has none; (3) 
Vereker ironically propounds the notion of the secret as a joke directed against the 
ridiculous game of literary criticism; (4) Corvick, on his part, only pretends to have 
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found the figure in order to force Gwendolen into marriage, and Gwendolen later 
cheats the narrator because she knows that in fact there is nothing to know. (11)2  
 
Borrowing terms from the Russian Formalists, Rimmon recasts her definition of narrative 
ambiguity as “the coexistence of mutually exclusive fabulas in one sjužet” (41). The fabula 
is “the totality of actions in their “natural” chronological and logical order”, the way things 
‘really happened.’ The author shapes the fabula into a sjužet by distorting the chronology, 
selecting a point of view, and so forth. The sjužet is the “artistically shaped ... presentation 
of the fabula” (34-6).3 In “The Figure in the Carpet”, the content of the general intention is 
an “informational gap” which remains open even at the end of the tale. This gap, supported 
by ancillary gaps (“the omission of information which could act as univocal evidence”), can 
be filled by textual clues to support, with equal viability, either one of the two mutually-
exclusive fabulas. James gives us nothing which would serve as conclusive evidence for 
either one (96-7). We see only what the narrator sees, and James sees to it that the narrator 
sees nothing that would prove either fabula as the ‘correct’ one.  
Rimmon clearly demonstrates the ambiguity pertaining to the existence of the 
figure, but this ambiguity does not make “The Figure in the Carpet” an ambiguous tale. The 
ambiguity she observes is merely a function of her two “finalized” hypotheses, and 
disappears when we replace them with different hypotheses, such as a, “The narrator 
cannot be objectively certain that there is a figure in Vereker’s carpet”; and ā, “The narrator 
can be objectively certain that there is a figure in Vereker’s carpet.” Of the two, a is the 
only valid choice. This neither validates nor invalidates the existence of the figure; it 
merely shifts the focus of the tale from the figure to the narrator. In this light, the story 
becomes a dramatization of the narrator’s lack of knowledge rather than a dramatization of 
Vereker’s hidden intention. Peter Halter claims that “the story consists of the narrator’s 
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attempts to fill in the missing information” – not the reader’s. Rimmon’s exclusive concern 
with the existence or non-existence of the figure ignores the rich possibilities for 
interpretation in the relationships between the characters (Halter 28-9). It also ignores the 
intriguing question as to what, if it exists, Vereker’s figure might be. 
The inadequacy of Rimmon’s definition of narrative ambiguity is perhaps better 
illustrated by another of James’s ‘ambiguous’ tales, “The Turn of the Screw”. The 
perennial debate surrounding this tale centers on the question of whether the governess who 
provides the first-person account actually sees ghosts or merely hallucinates them. The 
mutually exclusive “finalized” hypotheses Rimmon proposes for this tale are a, “There are 
real ghosts at Bly,” and ā, “There are no real ghosts at Bly” (10-11). Again, new hypotheses 
can be proposed which emphasize the governess’s lack of objective knowledge in the sjužet 
rather than the objective existence or non-existence of the ghosts in some unattainable 
fabula. The hypotheses I suggest are a, “The children see the ghosts,” and ā, “The children 
do not see the ghosts.” The governess herself is trying to decide between these hypotheses 
throughout the narrative, so the ambiguity is preserved, but as a function of the sjužet 
instead of as a function of two mutually exclusive fabulas. If Miles and Flora do see the 
ghosts, we have proof of their existence, and if they do not see them, we have proof that the 
governess is hallucinating. 
But there is no evidence to support these hypotheses either; and even if there were, 
it would still prove nothing about the existence of the ghosts. The children claim to see 
nothing, but like the governess their reliability is in question. Mrs. Grose, however – who is 
perhaps the most reliable character -- claims to see nothing when Miss Jessell appears by 
the lake (James, Stories 720). This should be sufficient proof that the governess is 
hallucinating, and yet the following day Mrs. Grose reiterates her belief in the ghosts (727). 
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That she believes where she does not see is due to the fact that she subscribes (as does the 
governess, as do the critics) to one of the traditional principles of ghost lore: the existence 
of ghosts does not depend upon their visibility. Some people can see them, others can’t.  
So are the ghosts real? They are to the governess. She does not know if the ghosts 
exist or are merely hallucinations; she only knows that she sees them. The reader may 
believe her or not, but the text provides no authorization for either view -- the objective 
existence of the ghosts simply cannot be determined. In Todorov’s view, “The Turn of the 
Screw” is a “narrative of a perception” (156) in which the reader sees “only the vision of 
someone and never the object of that vision directly” (150). Todorov sees this technical 
characteristic as “the constructive principle of [James’s] oeuvre” and as a manifestation of 
his hypothesis about the general intention of James’s tales (150-1; see above): 
To the question as to what really happened at Bly, James offers an oblique answer: 
he discredits the word “really,” he asserts the uncertainty of the experience when 
confronted with the stability – but also with the absence – of the essence. In fact, we 
do not even have the right to say “the governess is...” or “Peter Quint is not....” In 
this world, the verb to be has lost one of its functions, that of affirming existence 
and nonexistence. All our truths are no better founded than that of the governess. 
(159) 
  
Rimmon’s ‘ambiguous’ readings of both “The Turn of the Screw” and “The Figure 
in the Carpet” explain by means of two mutually exclusive fabulas an ambiguity that is 
already taken for granted in the sjužet. These tales are not ambiguous; they are simply tales 
about ambiguous situations. Rimmon’s notion of the fabula is as an objective reality which 
precedes the sjužet; the ambiguity is produced by the reader’s frustrated attempt to answer 
the question, Which explanation is true to reality? (134). But there is no reality, there is no 
fabula; there is only the sjužet. The question can only be answered by stepping outside the 
sjužet, by comparing the sjužet with the two fabulas; and these fabulas are unattainable. 
From whose point of view would the objectively true fabula, if it existed, be narrated? Any 
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other first-person narrative would be merely another subjective interpretation of reality, and 
as such no more or less reliable than the one we already have. These tales dramatize the 
subjectivity of perception; the attempt to determine an objective reality simply misses the 
point. As the narrator of James’s “The Real Thing” says, “I liked things that appeared; then 
one was sure. Whether they were or not was a subordinate and almost always a profitless 
question” (Stories 38-9).  
Studies of “The Figure in the Carpet” which followed in Rimmon’s wake have had 
to respond, in one way or another, to her charge of ambiguity. J. Hillis Miller considers 
Rimmon’s definition of narrative ambiguity “a misleadingly logical schematization of the 
alogical in literature” (112). For Miller, James’s tale is not an example of ambiguity but of 
“unreadability”: the variety of interpretations suggested by the tale “are not merely 
alternative possibilities” but imply and necessitate each other (112): “The text itself leads 
the reader to believe that he ought to be able to say what it means, while at the same time 
making that saying impossible” (113). Rachel Salmon disputes Rimmon’s insistence on 
reading the tale as a perpetual oscillation between two contradictory hypotheses, and 
suggests that the reader can experience both hypotheses simultaneously as the experience of 
paradox. The apparent ambiguity of James’s tale “can produce, eventually, a simultaneous 
perception: the figure exists for those capable of seeing it, but not for those who are 
incapable” (Salmon 801-2). We have already seen this conclusion in the work of Blackmur 
and Wirth-Nesher. For Salmon the subjectivity of the figure is an invitation to the reader to 
participate creatively in the work, to reenact “within himself that process by which meaning 
becomes luminous within the text” (800). The reader, in effect, “becomes the carpet 
bodying forth a figure” (802). Arguing against Miller as well as Rimmon, Peter Halter 
claims that James’s tale is not unreadable, in the sense that “it is about the act of reading 
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itself, and that this is an act that will never end and that, moreover, comprises much more 
than we usually dream of. James shows us that we are constantly engaged in reading, 
deciphering, interpreting – when we read a text, when we love, or go about our daily 
business” (37).  
Despite Rimmon’s insistence on the impossibility of choosing between mutually 
exclusive hypotheses, many of the critics mentioned above have done just that, proposing 
univocal (i.e., unambiguous) readings of James’s tale. Again, this fact may be better 
demonstrated by the similar critical history of “The Turn of the Screw”, which, at least until 
now, boasts a more substantial literature than “The Figure in the Carpet”. James’s 
contemporaries read “The Turn of the Screw” as a straightforward ghost story. It was not 
until 1919, over twenty years after the publication of the tale, that the first allegation of the 
governess’s insanity appeared in print (James and Beidler 130). Why did it take so long for 
the critics to recognize something that, for Rimmon, is so demonstrably there? According 
to Wayne C. Booth, at the turn of the century the unreliable narrator was still a relatively 
uncommon literary technique. With the arrival of Modernism a steady succession of 
unreliable narrators began to appear, and as critics developed a sensitivity to them they 
retrospectively began to question the reliability of the governess (Booth 366-7). The first 
critics to find ambiguity in “The Turn of the Screw” were not simply better readers; they 
were the first critics for whom ambiguity was something to look for. One wonders how the 
tale could have made any sense to previous critics, but apparently its success did not 
depend upon its ambiguity. James’s contemporaries did not look for ambiguity because 
nothing in the tale prompted them to do so: it made perfect sense as a straightforward ghost 
story.  
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But contemporary readers still frequently fail to recognize ambiguity in James’s 
tales. “The Turn of the Screw” still makes perfect sense as a straightforward ghost story, 
despite the fact that we are far better acquainted with ambiguity and unreliable narrators 
than James’s contemporaries were. I myself, as a Master’s candidate in English Literature, 
read the tale twice through (and enjoyed it immensely) as a straightforward ghost story 
before my reading of the criticism introduced me to the ‘hallucination theory.’ Rimmon 
provides an explanation for my tardy enlightenment: 
Perception of the ambiguity and the rate at which it is reached is ultimately a 
relative matter, conditioned by a variety of factors in the reader’s personal make-up, 
as well as in his experience of literature. Many readers are capable of a passionate 
perusal of The Turn of the Screw ... without ever realizing [its] ambiguity; others 
may become aware of the ambiguity only in retrospect, once their search for a final 
solution lands them with equipollent “candidates” or once they have read an 
Edmund Wilson article on the ambiguity of Henry James .... (56)4 
 
Apparently, ambiguity is only apparent to some readers, and even these readers may have to 
wait before they are able to perceive it. Although perception of ambiguity is related to 
experience of literature, it is also “conditioned by a variety of factors in the reader’s 
personal make-up,” although we are not told what these factors are or how we are to go 
about acquiring the necessary ones. From Rimmon’s description, stumbling upon the 
ambiguity seems to be a largely accidental affair. Among the factors Rimmon mentions, 
there is only one which the reader has any real control over: if we do not instinctively know 
to look for ambiguity, and if we do not stumble over it in our clumsy bumbling through the 
text, we at least have recourse to experienced readers like Wilson to show us the way.  
This is, of course, one of the ostensible purposes of criticism – to call our attention 
to aspects of the work which we may have missed – but it carries some serious 
implications. First of all, it renders the tale, in itself, incomplete. In a very real way the 
ambiguous “The Turn of the Screw” I am discussing here is not the tale I read twice 
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through, the tale written by James. It is the tale I came to know only after I had become 
acquainted with the criticism, a tale whose authorship is divided between James, Wilson, 
Rimmon, and others. Second, although Wilson is one of the experienced readers capable of 
recognizing ambiguity, he is perhaps too experienced -- to the point of being unreliable. 
Booth tells us that as critics gained experience in the new Modernist techniques, their 
heightened sensitivity to unreliable narrators often led them to find ambiguities where none 
exist. Wilson himself lauded Henry Miller’s Tropic books as an ingenious ironic portrait of 
“the genuine American bum come to lead the beautiful life in Paris”, only to find Miller 
repudiate any claim to irony: “The theme is myself, and the narrator ... is also myself” 
(Booth 367).  
On the other hand, although Wilson may not be infallible, I am uncomfortable with 
the suggestion that the irony he found in the Tropic books simply did not exist. How can 
irony so clearly exist for Wilson, and just as clearly not exist for Miller? How can 
ambiguity so clearly exist for Rimmon, and just as clearly not exist for all the readers who 
passionately peruse “The Turn of the Screw” as a ghost story? Is ambiguity in the text, or 
isn’t it? Judging by Rimmon’s description, the ambiguity is a foregone conclusion. The 
perception of ambiguity is undoubtedly a relative matter, as Rimmon says, but not because 
of any mental deficiency or lack of experience on the reader’s part, but because the 
ambiguity is not there in the first place:  
Irony and ambiguity are not properties of language but are functions of the 
expectations with which we approach it. If we expect a text to be ambiguous, we 
will in the act of reading it imagine situations in which it means first one thing and 
then another (there is no text with which this cannot be done) and those plural 
meanings will ... be that text’s literal reading. (Fish 277) 
 
What Stanley Fish is proposing here is that neither irony, nor ambiguity, nor anything else 
is in the text. What we perceive to be in the text is merely the product of what we look for. 
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That we approach a poem looking for a metrical pattern or a rhyme scheme makes those 
things very easy to spot, and because they are so easy to spot, we assume that they were in 
the poem long before we ever opened the book. The reason so many readers miss the 
ambiguity in James’s tales is because the ambiguity is not there to be missed: it does not 
exist until a reader looks for it and finds it. 
Rimmon herself provides a perfect illustration of Fish’s theory. In her preface, she 
quotes E.M. Gombrich to draw a parallel between narrative ambiguity and those ambiguous 
drawings in which one sees either a rabbit or a duck (Figure 1a; Hanson 90), a young 
woman or an old woman (Figure 1b), and so forth:  
we are compelled to look for what is ‘really there’, to see the shape apart from its 
interpretation, and this, we soon discover, is not really possible. True, we can switch 
from one reading to another with increasing rapidity; we will also ‘remember’ the 
rabbit while we see the duck, but the more closely we watch ourselves, the more 
certainly will we discover that we cannot experience alternative readings at the same 
time. (ix) 
 
 
       (a)     (b) 
Figure 1.  
 
Rimmon is using the rabbit/duck drawing to make the somewhat different point that, 
although we cannot experience the rabbit and the duck at the same time, the two 
contradictory interpretations are in the drawing. While this would seem to be incontestable, 
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we only know that the rabbit and the duck are both in the drawing because we are told that 
they are, and it is only because we are told that they are that we bother to look for them. If 
what Gombrich says is true, it is quite likely that a person who did not know that the 
drawing was intended to be ambiguous would see only the rabbit. But we always recognize 
these drawings as ambiguous, precisely because they are always presented as illustrations 
of ambiguity. We may not see the young woman, but we know she is there; the caption says 
so. Perhaps an even better example is the Magic Eye series of art posters, in which a 
seemingly abstract pattern can be made to reveal, through an adjustment of ocular focus, a 
three-dimensional image of a unicorn, a sailboat, and so forth. The viewer generally 
requires some measure of instruction before she can see the image, and the Magic Eye 
Corporation graciously provides instructions for this purpose (Magic 1).  
James’s tales, of course, are accompanied by no such captions or instructions. The 
ambiguity that Rimmon finds in them is not authorized by James’s intention or by the text 
itself but is simply the result of the search for ambiguity, and its only ‘authorization’ comes 
from critics like Rimmon who believe it is there. Critics like Salmon and Halter, however, 
who are familiar with Rimmon’s analysis of “The Figure in the Carpet” and nevertheless 
propose univocal readings which assert the existence of the figure, believe it is not there, 
and in doing so they are not simply ignoring the clear facts of the text. There is no scientific 
way to explain why they read the tale the way they do, but it seems inaccurate to speak of 
their readings as a choice between mutually exclusive interpretations. A reader does not 
choose to understand a text as ambiguous or univocal. She simply understands, and 
although she may later understand something different, she cannot choose to understand 
what she does not understand. Earlier I claimed that we cannot be objectively certain that 
Vereker’s general intention exists. In the remainder of this chapter I will present a univocal 
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reading of “The Figure in the Carpet” which asserts that it does exist. This may seem 
logically inconsistent, but literary interpretation, in this case at least, is not governed by 
logic. I believe my reading (otherwise I would never have understood it this way), and 
although I am capable of recognizing the ambiguity now that it has been pointed out to me, 
I cannot choose to understand “The Figure in the Carpet” as an ambiguous tale. The 
meaning of a literary work is not a potentiality but an actuality. It is not how we can 
interpret the tale that matters; it is how we do interpret it.  
 
Although “The Figure in the Carpet” dramatizes some of the devastating 
consequences of the reification of the author’s intention, the three primary characters are all 
ardent intentionalists in the strictest sense of the word. From the moment they learn of it 
Corvick and the narrator unhesitatingly accept Vereker’s intention as the thing to be 
discovered in his work. Much of the criticism surveyed above focuses on the efforts of the 
two critics to discover Vereker’s general intention. Vereker, meanwhile, gets lost in the 
shuffle, and criticism that concentrates on attacking or defending the tenability of the quest 
overlooks the equally important questions of what Vereker’s intention might be and what 
might be his interest in seeing that intention correctly perceived. Whereas for the critics the 
quest for the general intention represents a need to understand, for Vereker it represents the 
need to be understood. 
If Vereker needs to be understood, why doesn’t he simply tell the critics what his 
general intention is? Why won’t he, as the narrator asks, “assist the critic” (FC 366)? First, 
Vereker does not want to have to explain his novels. To do so would be to admit his failure 
to communicate his meaning, a failure he already suspects: “It’s quite with you rising 
young men,” he says, “that I feel most what a failure I am” (365). This could explain 
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Vereker’s regret about having revealed his secret to the narrator: as long as nobody knew 
the general intention was there, the failure to discover it could easily be attributed to the 
critics. But if critics began to search in earnest and still failed to find the general intention, 
Vereker’s competence as a novelist would be seriously in doubt.  
Second, Vereker has told the critic his general intention. “I’ve shouted my intention 
in his great blank face!” (FC 366), he says; the obscurity of his novels is an unfortunate 
accident. But Vereker’s intention did not become clear, and the narrator now asks the 
novelist to state his intention more clearly. There is good reason to assume that the 
intention can be stated in another way. Vereker would not, after all, be urging the narrator 
to state an intention that had already been clearly stated. His intention, then, must not be 
bound by form; it must exist independently of the words on the page. The narrator could, I 
suppose, have sat down beside Vereker, poured himself a cup of tea, and, beginning on the 
first page of the first novel, read the whole of Vereker’s oeuvre word for word. Slamming 
the last book shut, he would triumphantly shout “That is your general intention!” But this is 
not the general intention Vereker is looking for.  
Although the general intention can be stated in another way, Vereker cannot do it. 
When the narrator accuses him of expecting critics to articulate a meaning he can’t 
articulate himself, Vereker replies, “Haven’t I done it in twenty volumes?” (FC 369). The 
narrator takes this as an evasion: he assumes that Vereker is, for perverse artistic reasons 
perhaps, withholding his general intention. Three-quarters of the way through the tale the 
narrator is still considering writing to Vereker and asking him for the general intention 
(388). But Vereker doesn’t know it – at least, not in any other way. Vereker’s novels 
constitute the only expression of the general intention he is able to give.  
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As Wolfgang Iser suggests, the narrator sees the literary work as a kind of puzzle: 
the author begins with a clear meaning, understandable to anyone, and disguises it through 
the application of literary form. The reader’s job is to tear away this disguise, revealing the 
clear meaning underneath. The disadvantages of this ‘puzzle model’ are obvious enough. 
Under such a model, it is not the work which is of value but the meaning which can be 
extracted from the work. There is clearly no point in reading the work once the meaning 
has been extracted, and the only thing for the reader to do is gloat over his own interpretive 
skill (Iser 4-5). Unless one is fond of puzzles, there is no reason to read the literary work at 
all, especially in this day and age, when the solution could easily be found on the Internet in 
about five minutes. Nor can an author who disguises a clear meaning care very much for 
that meaning or be particularly interested in communicating it.  
On the plus side, the puzzle model recognizes that from the author’s perspective the 
literary work consists, as it were, of two levels: the author’s text represents the author’s 
intended meaning. Meaning does not inhere in the words but lies ‘behind’ them. But this 
meaning is not in itself clear, as the puzzle model presumes. The transformation of the 
author’s meaning to the author’s text is not a process of disguising a clear meaning, but a 
process of clarifying a meaning far more enigmatic. This meaning is pre-linguistic, and thus 
has the capacity to include contents of consciousness not easily expressed in language. It is 
the art and craft of the author to express such contents of consciousness in language, and 
for this reason any understanding of the intended meaning is not limited to a paraphrase of 
‘what the words mean.’ The narrator mistakenly believes that Vereker could provide him 
with a paraphrase of his general intention. But Vereker’s novels are the clearest paraphrase 
he is able to make. The general intention is a pre-linguistic meaning, and the critic’s 
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mission, should he choose to accept it, is to recover the general intention from the 
representation of that intention furnished by Vereker’s novels. 
The narrator and (in the beginning) Corvick demonstrate how this is not to be done. 
Both critics begin the quest for Vereker’s general intention with certain preconceptions 
about what the figure is and how it is to be discovered. These preconceptions constrain the 
critics’ imaginations and are couched in metaphors which illustrate the ‘vulgarity’ of their 
brand of literary criticism. The narrator asks Vereker if the figure is “some sort of 
philosophy” or “some kind of game you’re up to with your style” (FC 368). In his perusal 
of the novels, the narrator “picked out each in its order and held it up to the light” (370), as 
if the figure was hidden inside the pages. Corvick projects his quest for the figure in 
metaphors which are caricatures of his deification of the author (“he had no wish to 
approach the altar before he had prepared the sacrifice”) and the predatory role of the critic 
(he is determined to “run [Vereker] to earth” and “bring down the animal with his own 
rifle”; 377). 
Although they begin their respective quests with similarly “vulgar” notions, the two 
critics differ in their interpretive methodologies. In a single paragraph we accompany the 
narrator’s “maddening” quest from its hopeful beginnings to its conclusion that the general 
intention is “a monstrous pose” (FC 370). His failure to discover a figure is immediate and 
decisive: four short sentences into the paragraph his quest has already ended in “a dead 
loss” (370). The narrator uses the scientific method, beginning with a hypothesis and 
testing it against the evidence of the text, and suggests that Corvick will take a similar 
approach: “he would bound off on false scents as I had done – he would clap his hands over 
new lights and see them blown out by the wind of the turned page” (376). Like the narrator, 
Corvick and Gwendolen begin their quest in close textual study, but for them the quest is a 
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game in which playing is more exciting than winning: “There was no hurry, Corvick said – 
the future was before them and the fascination could only grow; they would take him page 
by page, as they would take one of the classics, inhale him in slow draughts and let him 
sink all the way in” (375).  
This image of inhaling is, as Rachel Salmon says, “an image in which subject and 
object fuse” (796), and suggests an approach to the text considerably different from the 
kind of scanning which would suffice if the figure was, as the narrator surmises, “a 
preference for the letter P” (FC 368). Inhaling suggests a re-cognition of the words on the 
page, an appropriation of those words as one’s own, a realizing of those words as ideas or 
emotions. Through this realization the fiction of the printed page is transformed into the 
fact of the reader’s actual thoughts and emotions. Scanning is an altogether different kind 
of cognitive act. The scanner regards the literary work as a visual entity – a verbal icon -- 
examining it vertically and horizontally, jumping back and forth, performing other 
maneuvers which interrupt the sequential realization of the words as thoughts and 
emotions. 
Nevertheless, Corvick’s inhaling fails to produce the general intention. Then 
suddenly, after six months in India, the figure in the carpet appears. Gwendolen reports to 
the narrator: 
it’s the thing itself, let severely alone for six months, that has simply sprung out at 
him like a tigress out of the jungle. He didn’t take a book with him – on purpose; 
indeed he wouldn’t have needed to – he knows every page, as I do, by heart. They 
all worked in him together, and some day somewhere, when he wasn’t thinking, 
they fell, in all their superb intricacy, into the one right combination ... The elements 
were all in his mind, and in the secousse of a new and intense experience they just 
struck light. (FC 381-2) 
 
Two conclusions can be drawn from this report. First, the discovery of the general intention 
is not a necessary result of the attempt to find it. In relocating to India, Corvick abandons 
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the active search -- which yielded nothing -- in favor of a passive reception. He has 
recognized that he cannot force himself to understand; having inhaled the novels, all he can 
do is sit tight and hope. The hunting metaphor which characterized the early stages of his 
quest now sees its comeuppance: he does not pounce on the figure; it is the figure that 
pounces on him, “like a tigress out of the jungle” (FC 381). The figure cannot be frog-
marched out of the carpet, but, as Vereker says, must “dawn on you” (365-6). Corvick’s 
discovery is not the result of conscious cognition but is rather a sudden perception. The 
figure dawns on him in the same way that the duck or the young woman in the ambiguous 
drawings suddenly dawn on us after we have been staring at them for several minutes. Just 
as Corvick cannot force himself to discover the figure, we cannot force ourselves to see the 
duck or the young woman: “thinking hard will seldom enable one to see an aspect of a 
figure which he has been previously unable to notice” (Hanson 94). 
While he is waiting for the figure in the carpet to emerge, Corvick does not just sit 
in a chair twiddling his thumbs -- he gets on with his life. The second conclusion implied 
by Gwendolen’s report is that a certain kind of experience is a necessary prerequisite for 
the discovery of the general intention. James remarks that “it is with the kinds of criticism 
exactly as it is with the kinds of art -- the best kind, the only kind worth speaking of, is the 
kind that springs from the liveliest experience” (Selected 170). Corvick has a vast reservoir 
of lively experience to draw on. Unlike the narrator, a bachelor whose sole occupation, as 
far as we know, is his literary endeavors, Corvick is deeply involved in the social world. 
When we first meet Corvick, he is so preoccupied with his fiancée and her ailing mother 
that he has “not even had time to read” Vereker’s novel, of which he has promised a review 
(FC 358). Vereker suggests that Corvick’s impending marriage may help in his quest for 
the figure (373); the narrator, who envies “Corvick’s possession of a friend who had some 
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light to mingle with his own” (375), agrees. Corvick seizes every opportunity for new 
experience. Commenting on his inexperience as a newspaper correspondent, the narrator 
says “the fact that a particular task was not in his line was apt to be with himself exactly a 
reason for accepting it” (379). Driving dog-carts is not in Corvick’s line, as Corvick himself 
knows, and his acceptance of that task leads to his death (388-9). For Corvick, literature is 
more than just books, it is life: “He’d call it letters, he’d call it life, but it was all one thing” 
(374).  
So how does Corvick’s experience in India lead him to the discovery of the general 
intention? Did Corvick meet some Bombay swami who had read Vereker’s novels and was 
willing to share his knowledge of the general intention? Or are the novels an allegory of 
some aspect of Indian history which Corvick knew nothing about until he made his 
voyage? We don’t know, of course; but the connection need not be so explicit. Perhaps 
Corvick did not need to go to India to discover the general intention, and perhaps he did not 
need to go anywhere at all. Corvick does not simply acquire the general intention as if it 
were for sale in some remote corner of Bombay; he acquires, through his experiences, a 
context of knowledge (what reading researchers call a schema) within which the general 
intention no longer needs to be sought but is rather already apparent. This context of 
knowledge can only be acquired through experience, and the general intention can only be 
discovered if one possesses that context of knowledge. Like many critics, the narrator 
mistakenly believes that he possesses all the contexts of knowledge necessary for the 
comprehension of all literary intentions, and so his failure to perceive Vereker’s intention 
can only be a clerical error. But all readers do not share the same contexts of knowledge. 
Contexts of knowledge are only acquired through experience, and there is no way to know 
what context of knowledge, if any, a particular experience will produce. All Corvick 
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required was six months in India. For the narrator, it may require losing a limb, going to 
war or falling in love. This may strike some people as a rather exclusive approach to 
literary interpretation. And it is exclusive, if one insists that this meaning is the one and 
only meaning of the text. It is certainly no more exclusive than claiming that you cannot 
know what it feels like to fall in love if you yourself have never fallen in love. According to 
Robert Scholes,  
Many literary works assume experience of life as an aspect of their context shared 
by writer and reader. Some works refuse to open to us until we are sufficiently 
mature. Others close as we lose access to some contexts through growing or 
forgetting ... For those who have experienced such things as marriage or 
bereavement the words themselves will signify something different than they will 
for those who have had no experience of these things – and much of literature is 
based on attempts to generate semiotic equivalents for experiences that seem to defy 
duplication in mere signs. (35) 
 
In this light, interpretive disagreements are due partly to the fact that certain meanings are 
only available to certain readers. If Vereker’s general intention is ‘about’ marriage, for 
example (there is, in fact, reason to believe that it is), then it may be that only those with 
first-hand experience of marriage will be able to discover it. As Scholes suggests, however, 
just as contexts of knowledge are grown into, they may also be grown out of. This is 
particularly important, because it challenges the popular belief that an older or more 
educated reader is necessarily better equipped to understand literature. But just as a ten-
year-old may lack the experience to understand what an author means by the word 
‘bereavement,’ so may a sixty-year-old forget what it feels like to be a disillusioned 
teenager, and so fail to understand Salinger’s intention in The Catcher in the Rye.  
But is the meaning that Corvick discovers in India really the same thing as 
Vereker’s general intention? I stated earlier that an author’s meaning is pre-linguistic, and 
as such can include subjective contents of consciousness such as the author’s emotions and 
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the private associations she attaches to words. If so, it would seem to be impossible for 
Corvick to recover the same meaning that Vereker originally intended to convey. Even if he 
could, he could never know that he had done so. Hirsch says that “Since we cannot get 
inside the author’s head, it is useless to fret about an intention that cannot be observed” 
(Validity 16), and for this reason he specifies his definition of meaning as verbal meaning. 
The author’s verbal meaning must be sharable, and in order to be sharable it must “fall 
within known conventions” (Validity 66-7). This is functional enough as a definition, but it 
suggests some very serious consequences. To whom are these conventions known? Must 
they be universal conventions, or does it suffice that most literary critics are aware of them? 
If Corvick’s discovery proves the sharability of the general intention, it only proves the 
sharability of the general intention to Corvick. The conventions (or contexts of knowledge) 
on which Corvick’s discovery depend do not appear to be universal or even generally 
known among literary critics: he only acquires them as the result of his “new and intense 
experience” in India. My question is this: should Vereker’s intention count as the objective 
meaning of his novels, when the discovery of that intention requires a knowledge of 
conventions so arcane that even an exceptional critic like Corvick has to fly halfway around 
the world in order to acquire it? By Hirsch’s logic, as long as the critics are unable to 
discover Vereker’s intention, that intention is not sharable (i.e., it has never been shared) 
and does not qualify as the meaning of the novels. When Corvick discovers the intention, 
however, the intention suddenly ‘becomes’ sharable, and every reader in the world but 
Corvick and Vereker is excluded from the objective meaning of Vereker’s novels. To put it 
in evaluative terms, prior to Corvick’s discovery, Vereker’s novels are bad novels insofar 
as we assume that he has ineptly expressed his intention. When Corvick discovers the 
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intention, he proves that Vereker has succeeded in expressing it. The novels become good 
novels, and the ineptitude falls to every reader but Corvick and Vereker.  
If the conventions Hirsch speaks of need only be shared by the community of 
literary critics (or even by the community of arbitrarily-determined ‘competent’ readers), 
then all readers who, through no fault of their own, have not acquired a knowledge of those 
conventions are excluded from the discovery of the meaning of a literary work. They may 
enjoy the work, but it is impossible for them to know what it means. Nor can they do 
anything to better their situation. While a knowledge of the conventions may certainly be 
acquired, it may not necessarily be acquired at will, as the case of Corvick shows, and in 
fact may never be acquired, even by the most diligent reader, as in the case of the narrator. 
On the other hand, if the conventions are universal, then the author is restricted in the kinds 
of meanings he may produce. In order for the author’s intention to be considered the 
meaning of the literary work, that intention must be a kind of lowest common denominator 
of meaning, something that all readers, of all ages and backgrounds, can potentially 
understand. This suggestion is clearly ludicrous. What the ten-year-old constructs as the 
verbal meaning of Thus Spake Zarathustra would almost certainly be incommensurate with 
Nietzsche’s intention, and it is preposterous to limit the verbal meaning of Thus Spake 
Zarathustra to what the ten-year-old can understand. I use the ten-year-old to make a point, 
of course. The reader may be a forty-year-old philosopher or a sixty-year-old rocket 
scientist and still fail to understand Nietzsche’s intention.  
Even an agreement about Nietzsche’s intention may be a far cry from Nietzsche’s 
intention. For Hirsch, the aim of interpretation is not certainty about the author’s intention 
but rather a determination about what the author probably meant. But if it is not what the 
author meant, the word ‘probably’ is meaningless -- as the saying goes, ‘almost’ only 
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counts in horseshoes and hand grenades. If Hirsch’s aim is to preserve the possibility of 
objective knowledge, then an agreement about the meaning would in fact be a feasible aim 
for interpretation: we can objectively know what we have agreed to call the meaning of the 
work. But this is objective knowledge only of an agreement; it in no way constitutes 
objective knowledge of the author’s intention. The reader will recall that the attempt to 
determine an objective fabula from the evidence in the sjužet was my complaint with 
Shlomith Rimmon’s theory of ambiguity. We cannot know that the ghosts in “The Turn of 
the Screw” exist; we can only know that the governess sees them. We cannot know that 
there is a figure in Vereker’s carpet, we can only know that Vereker and Corvick say there 
is one.  
If we are determined to strive for objective knowledge in literary interpretation, it 
may be more feasible to simply agree on what the meaning of a literary work will 
henceforth be than to claim that this meaning is ‘probably’ what the author intended. 
Personally, I am unwilling to sacrifice my own understanding of any literary work for the 
sake of being in agreement with a community of readers. And yet, it is still possible for me 
to attain a certain diluted objectivity. I simply take as my interpretive goal not the objective 
knowledge of a universal absolute, but rather an ‘objective’ knowledge of my own 
subjective perception. If I cannot know with certainty what a literary work means, I can at 
least know what I understand it to mean.  
And yet even in this certainty we can be mistaken. Under close inspection of “The 
Figure in the Carpet” we see how much we take for granted, how much we have presumed 
about the narrative. Despite the fact that James gives us no proof of the existence of the 
figure in the carpet, it is difficult, at least on the first reading, not to take its existence for 
granted, simply because we do not normally presume that the characters in a literary work 
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are lying unless we have good reason to do so. I refer the reader to the plot summary at the 
beginning of this chapter. Although I tried to present as objective a summary of James’s 
tale as possible, my presumption that I knew what I did not know is, in retrospect, 
strikingly evident. How, for example, do I know that Vereker is unaware that the narrator is 
the author of the review? How do I know that Vereker confirms Corvick’s discovery? How 
do I know that Deane knows nothing about the figure in the carpet? For that matter, how do 
I know that Corvick is killed in a dog-cart or that the narrator is really a literary critic? I do 
not know. But I believe, and the one thing I can say with certainty is that I know I believe. 
Before we follow Corvick on the next stage of his adventure, let us consider how 
the reader’s understanding of a literary work is expressed in language. The bi-level model 
of the literary work I discussed earlier (the author’s pre-linguistic meaning that lies behind 
the author’s written text) can be recast as a description of the reader’s – or, more exactly, 
the critic’s – interpretation of the literary work. Hirsch distinguishes between the processes 
of understanding, or the reader’s construction of the meaning of a text, and interpretation, 
which is the explanation of that meaning (Validity 129). I prefer to reserve ‘interpretation’ 
to indicate a variety of acts, not limited to what the reader does, and will therefore 
substitute it with the word articulation to denote any verbal or written explanation of the 
reader’s understanding. Understanding is a pre-linguistic construction of meaning, and 
consequently can encompass a wide range of meaning before that meaning is constrained 
by language in the exigencies of articulation. The process of articulating a pre-linguistic 
complex of meaning is similar, if not identical, to what the author does when she 
transforms her meaning into a text. The author begins with a complex of meaning, an 
understanding, which she expresses in a text, or articulation.  
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Having discovered the general intention, Corvick must now confirm his discovery 
with Vereker. To do this, he must first communicate his discovery. How this is done is not 
especially important; he can communicate it in words, in bodily gestures, a facial 
expression, or telepathically. I do, however, disagree with those critics (Iser, Salmon, 
Williams) who claim that the general intention cannot be communicated in words. After all, 
Vereker has communicated it in words; if the general intention is a pre-linguistic complex 
of meaning, then the same options for linguistic communication that Vereker employs are 
in theory available to Corvick. In Iser’s reading, meaning is an effect, and Corvick is unable 
to translate the effect of the general intention into an explanation: “After he has experienced 
the meaning of Vereker’s novel [sic], his life is changed. But all he can do is report this 
extraordinary change – he cannot explain or convey the meaning as the critic seeks to do” 
(10). But Corvick does convey the meaning – first to Vereker, then to Gwendolen. I find it 
difficult to accept that the mere report of a change, without any description of the cause of 
that change, would have satisfied either Vereker’s or Gwendolen’s standards for proof. For 
years Vereker trolled the literary papers for just such a proof. Gwendolen becomes so 
extraordinarily changed herself that she will speak of her knowledge of the figure as “my 
life” (FC 392) – could the mere report of a change do that? If Corvick conveyed the general 
intention through some non-linguistic form, he at least believed that it was possible to 
convey it linguistically, as he planned to write “a great last word on Vereker’s writings,” an 
“exhaustive study” which would “utter ... the unimagined truth” (FC 387).  
When Iser says that Corvick cannot “explain or convey” the general intention, he is 
expressing an aversion to a “single referential meaning” (8), a paraphrase, the kind of 
explanation of the novels that the narrator is looking for. But to convey a meaning does not 
necessarily imply a reduction to referential language. The concept of referential language 
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presumably became a necessity as critics realized that, although the meaning of a literary 
work can never be delivered in neat linguistic formulations or messages (such as the ‘moral 
of the story’ in Aesop’s fables), language is nevertheless the medium in which that meaning 
is delivered. Referential language was thus distinguished from other kinds of language: I. 
A. Richards says that a “statement may be used for the sake of the reference, true or false, 
which it causes. This is the scientific use of language. But it may also be used for the sake 
of the effects in emotion and attitude produced by the reference it occasions. This is the 
emotive use of language” (Principles 211).  
Richards’ use of these terms is geared towards poetry, but the distinction is equally 
applicable to the prose narrative, being roughly analogous to the traditional distinction 
between showing and telling. To hazard an example: an author is writing a novel in which 
she intends to convey the sense of a suicidal depression triggered by terminal illness. Every 
formal device, every literary technique, will minister to that effect. She may choose to write 
in the form of daily journal entries to emphasize the passage of time and the steady 
approach of death. These entries may become progressively shorter as the narrator loses the 
strength to write. There may be few characters and little dialogue in order to create an 
atmosphere of isolation, to which the cadence of the prose, the diction, the images and 
metaphors will contribute. And all of this may be done without the use of the words 
“suicidal” or “depression” (in fact, to suggest that those words convey the author’s 
intention is already to reduce that intention to referential language, and my need for them 
illustrates the dilemma of the critic). What paraphrase could convey the total effect of such 
a novel, if the novel itself did not make it clear? For the author to substitute the novel with 
the words “What I mean to convey is a sense of suicidal depression” is to drastically limit, 
or at the very least to alter, the intended meaning.  
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The distinction between the two types of language is equally important for the critic, 
who faces a dilemma when confronted with the need to articulate her understanding. The 
above example may suggest that the critic’s only options are either to hopelessly reduce the 
meaning or to simply repeat the words of the text. Tzvetan Todorov offers some 
alternatives: 
No doubt there is an untheorizable element in literature, as Michel Deguy calls it, if 
theory presupposes scientific language. One function of literature is the subversion 
of this very language; hence it is extremely rash to claim we can read it exhaustively 
with the help of that very language it calls into question. To do so is equivalent to 
postulating the failure of literature. At the same time, this dilemma is much too 
inclusive for us to be able to escape it: confronted with a poem, we can only resign 
ourselves to the impoverishment caused by a different language, or else (a factitious 
solution) write another poem. Factitious because this second text will be a new work 
which still awaits its reading: an entire autonomy deprives criticism of its raison 
d’être, just as a submission to ordinary language affects it with a certain sterility. 
There remains, of course, a third solution which is silence: we cannot speak of that. 
(246) 
 
It is this third solution that Iser invokes when he says that “Meaning as effect is a 
perplexing phenomenon, and such perplexity cannot be removed by explanations – on the 
contrary, it invalidates them” (10). But Vereker does not feel that his own explanation is 
invalidated by his experience of meaning; in fact, he considers his “application” of his 
general intention to be “a triumph” (FC 366). Neither does he feel that the critic’s 
explanation will compromise his general intention – as long as it is an explanation of the 
general intention. It is he who instigates the quest, and he is apparently delighted with 
Corvick’s discovery. The critic has an obligation and an ability over and above that of the 
general reader: “the critic just isn’t a plain man” (FC 367), Vereker says; critics are “little 
demons of subtlety” (367) whose job is to look for, find, and report the author’s intentions. 
There is, perhaps, a way in which Vereker’s entire oeuvre could be boiled down into a one-
page critical summary, and Vereker might be tempted to try if he thought he could do it. 
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But he can only articulate his intention in emotive language, and at one point laments, “if I 
were only, pen in hand, one of you chaps!” (369). In drawing the distinction between the 
novelist’s job and the critic’s, Vereker is echoed by Gwendolen, who is also a novelist: “I 
don’t “review[...]” ... I’m reviewed!” (393). 
In Iser’s defense, several characters do have difficulty articulating their 
understandings of Vereker’s work. Vereker himself, having fully expressed his general 
intention in emotive language, is stumped when he tries to describe it in referential 
language: “By my little point I mean – what shall I call it?” (FC 365). Corvick, in reference 
to his original, pre-discovery understanding of the novels, declares that Vereker “gives me 
a pleasure so rare; the sense of’ – he mused a little – ‘something or other” (359). Although 
he cannot say what Vereker’s novels mean, he knows they mean something: “What he 
would have said, had he reviewed the new book, was that there was evidently in the 
writer’s inmost art something to be understood” (371). Corvick’s initial experience of the 
meaning of Vereker’s novels is as a certain je ne sais quoi, a sense of meaningfulness, and 
his description of this sense of meaningfulness is sensual and non-linguistic: “he had caught 
whiffs and hints of he didn’t know what, faint wandering notes of a distant music” (376).  
Lady Jane also understands a meaning (not the general intention) which she cannot 
express in words, but manages to communicate in symbolic form: “Lady Jane threw into 
her eyes a look evidently intended to give an idea of what she always felt; but she added 
that she couldn’t have expressed it” (FC 361). She adds, however, that in his review the 
narrator “expressed it in a striking manner” (361). Her inability to express this 
understanding in language makes it no less meaningful to her. Roughly equivalent to the 
narrator’s understanding, Lady Jane’s understanding may be only “the usual twaddle”, but 
it is nevertheless an understanding that has been found in Vereker’s work. There is no real 
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need for her to be able to express it in language: she is no critic. Although Lady Jane’s 
understanding is ineffable, it is only ineffable for her. Ineffability is not a property of 
meaning, as Iser argues. It is simply a particular reader’s inability to articulate her 
understanding in language.  
Although he has discovered the general intention and somehow conveyed his 
discovery to Vereker and Gwendolen, Corvick has the additional responsibility of the critic 
to cogently and intelligibly articulate his understanding to the reading public. Peter Halter 
suggests that “the real moment of truth is the one in which he has to name the secret he has 
discovered” (36). Whether or not Corvick could have named the secret, that moment of 
truth is pre-empted by his accidental death. It may be that the narrator, rather than Corvick, 
is the only successful critic in the tale. If the critic’s job is merely to discover intentions, 
then Corvick is indeed the “victor”; but if the critic’s job is to articulate her own 
understanding in the public press, then it is the narrator who must be crowned “with the 
critical laurel” (FC 377). The narrator considers himself a failure because he cannot 
discover the general intention, but he doesn’t doubt that he has correctly ascertained 
Vereker’s “subordinate intentions” (370). Critics such as Iser attack the narrow type of 
meaning the narrator proceeds to search for after he learns of the general intention. But his 
understanding of the novels prior to his first encounter with Vereker is not necessarily 
narrow – it could in fact be his life; we are never told what his review consists of. Until 
Vereker dismisses his review, the narrator believes that he has successfully articulated the 
meaning of Vereker’s novel. His review has the added advantage of articulating a sharable 
understanding, as he speaks not only for his own understanding but for Lady Jane’s as well.  
In this light, “The Figure in the Carpet” neither defends nor indicts the search for an 
author’s intention. Vereker’s figure is a double-edged sword: for the critic who is able to 
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discover it, the novels are “an experience quite apart” (385). But for the critic who is not 
able to discover it, “Instead of being a pleasure the more they became a resource the less” 
(370). One wonders if the critics would be so inclined to dismiss the narrator as a 
“Philistine” (Iser 4), regardless of his methodology, had his methodology succeeded in 
producing the general intention. The critics generally regard the narrator as a schmuck.  
What I am suggesting here is that, when we regard the reader as the source of the meaning 
of the literary work, the narrator’s ‘incorrect’ understanding of Vereker’s novels is just as 
valid as Corvick’s ‘correct’ one.  
Of course, the narrator sees himself as a failure. But if he is, he is not entirely to 
blame. In writing his review for The Middle the narrator has merely obeyed Vereker’s 
injunction in advance: “I do it in my way ... Go you and don’t do it in yours” (FC 369). The 
narrator already has done it in his way, and Vereker has, rather hypocritically, rejected his 
way as “the usual twaddle”. A certain duplicity characterizes Vereker’s intercourse with the 
narrator. The descriptions Vereker offers not only do not make the general intention “very 
distinct” (365) but are in fact a bunch of mixed clues. His metaphors oscillate between the 
self-deprecating and the grandiose: the general intention is both a “little point” (364) and 
“the part of the business in which...the flame of art burns most intensely” (365), a “little 
trick” (366) and the “loveliest thing in the world” (369). As the narrator observes, Vereker 
is “a man of unstable moods” (373), first inviting the narrator to look for the general 
intention, then admonishing him to give it up, and later regretting having told him in the 
first place. Whatever his reasons for these shifts, it is hardly surprising that the narrator 
comes to the conclusion that “so far as the subject of the tip went, there wasn’t much in it” 
(373). Vereker seems to have neither full cognizance of his own mind nor any principled 
stance on the matter of authorial intention. He wants his intention to be discovered 
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independently, but can’t resist revealing his secret to the first critic to show “a spice of 
intelligence” (364). At their second meeting, Vereker again tells the narrator to give up the 
quest, on the grounds of “having saddled [him] with a knowledge that [he] may find 
something of a burden” (372). His ostensible reason for this retraction is that he doesn’t 
want to give the critics the “tip”; but perhaps he has come to regard his own intention as 
irrelevant, and potentially harmful, to the narrator’s understanding. The narrator’s mistake 
is not that his understanding of the novels is wrong; his mistake is that he defers to 
Vereker’s authority and sacrifices a meaningful understanding of the novels, when even the 
author is not sure that his authority ought to be deferred to.  
But let us return to Corvick. Although we do not know how Corvick communicates 
his discovery to Vereker, there is no a priori reason that he cannot articulate it in language. 
Let us assume that he does so. In order to confirm that Corvick has discovered the 
intention, Vereker must recognize some evidence of it in Corvick’s articulation. According 
to Fish, whenever we articulate an understanding we substitute “for our immediate 
linguistic experience an interpretation or abstraction of it, in which “it” is inevitably 
compromised” (32). If so, Corvick’s articulation is a compromise of his understanding 
(and, by the same token, Vereker’s novels are a compromise of his general intention), but 
no more so than the utterance “chair” is a compromise of one’s sensory experience of a 
chair. The utterance “chair” is a reduction to referential language of the phenomenal object 
– it does not contain all the perceived ‘chairness’ -- but it is nevertheless possible to 
recognize from the utterance that a particular type of phenomenal object is being referred 
to. In the same way, any articulation is a compromise of the understanding it seeks to 
articulate. But the articulation does not have to contain the understanding in its entirety (it 
never does); it simply has to furnish evidence that a particular understanding has been 
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achieved. Vereker recognizes from Corvick’s articulation that this understanding has been 
achieved, just as Corvick recognizes Vereker’s understanding from his novels. It is now 
Corvick’s text that awaits interpretation, and Vereker has to go through the same process of 
interpretation that Corvick went through. This process is naturally much easier for Vereker, 
as he already possesses the relevant contexts of knowledge, and furthermore already knows 
what he is looking for (in terms of the Magic Eye metaphor, he already knows how to look 
at the poster and what the image looks like). There is no distinctive earmark by which 
Vereker recognizes that Corvick is correct – as Gwendolen surmises, you simply know it 
when you see it (FC 381).  
But how does Vereker confirm that Corvick has indeed discovered the general 
intention, when I claimed earlier that it is impossible for the reader to have exactly the same 
understanding as the author? The simple answer is that Corvick and Vereker do not need to 
have exactly the same experience. The general intention is not only general in that it runs 
through the whole of Vereker’s oeuvre; it is also general in the sense that it is not specific. 
This lack of specificity allows Vereker to recognize in Corvick’s articulation the evidence 
of an understanding that coincides with his general intention, while not being equal to it. A 
model for this generality of intention is suggested by Hirsch’s definition of verbal meaning 
as a type: “A type is an entity with two decisive characteristics. First, it is an entity that has 
a boundary by virtue of which something belongs to it or does not ... The second decisive 
characteristic of a type is that it can always be represented by more than one instance” 
(Validity 49-50). A type functions like an et cetera: the author intends a set of meanings, 
but he is only conscious of some of the meanings included in that set. As Hirsch says, “it is 
only through this concept [of type] that verbal meaning can be (as it is) a determinate object 
of consciousness and yet transcend (as it does) the actual contents of consciousness” 
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(Validity 49). Vereker, perhaps, is only conscious of a single intention A, or rather a single 
experience A, which he articulated in his novels. Because it is impossible for two people to 
have exactly the same experience, Corvick is not able to recognize the novels as a 
representation of A. But his reading of the novels produces experience D; and, although 
Vereker did not have that particular experience D, he recognizes that D is included in his 
type. Vereker’s novels represent two unique experiences within the same type. A man who 
is suicidally depressed over a market crash may understand a meaning which falls within 
the same type of the general intention of the terminally-ill author, and yet their 
understandings are obviously not the same. 
Having argued for the possibility of the existence, discovery, articulation and 
confirmation of Vereker’s general intention, I would like to consider the major argument 
against it. I concluded earlier in this chapter that “The Figure in the Carpet” is not 
ambiguous in the definition proposed by Rimmon because the ambiguity, rather than being 
a choice between two mutually exclusive fabulas, is already present to the narrator in the 
sjužet. We therefore can neither choose between the two fabulas, nor refuse to choose 
between them. There is no choice: the tale provides no objective proof of the general 
intention. Any interpretation is simply the reader’s subjective belief about whether or not 
that intention exists. Challenging “the prevalent tendency in James criticism to identify all 
ambiguity with the problem of the reliability or unreliability of the narrator”, Rimmon 
claims that the ambiguity in “The Figure in the Carpet” is due rather to the unreliability of 
Corvick and Vereker (101-2). Usually, a character’s unreliability is due to the presence of 
some kind of unreliability marker, such as a suspicious feature in a character’s discourse (as 
in Poe’s “The Tell-Tale Heart”) or some gross discrepancy between a character’s assertions 
and other evidence furnished by the narrative. Nothing of this sort marks either Corvick or 
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Vereker. What Rimmon calls their unreliability is entirely circumstantial, being due to the 
fact that the narrator (and hence the reader) receives no proof of their claims, and to the fact 
that to both Corvick and Vereker a fairly feasible motive for dissimulation can be imputed. 
The narrator, on the other hand, is marked as being to some extent unreliable, both by a 
certain emotional immaturity and by a tendency toward misinterpretation which extends 
beyond his ‘misinterpretation’ of Vereker’s works.  
According to Rimmon, it is not the narrator’s claims which are called into question; 
he rather serves as a touchstone for the validity of the claims of Corvick and Vereker (102). 
It is precisely as a touchstone, however, that his reliability is called into question. Although 
the narrator cannot prove that Corvick and Vereker are telling the truth, he believes them. 
He has a perfect motive to disbelieve, in that his disbelief in the general intention would 
justify his failure to discover it; and he does disbelieve for a time. But despite the lack of 
proof and the motive for disbelief, at the end of the tale he is fully convinced of the 
existence of the figure and Corvick’s discovery of it. Why? He doesn’t tell us. But the 
narrator has more evidence on which to base his belief than the reader has. Apart from the 
narrator’s assessment of Corvick and Vereker (which is precisely what is called into 
question), the reader has only their spoken statements by which to determine if they are 
reliable. The narrator, however, can see them and hear them. He has not only their words 
but also their tone of voice, inflections, facial expressions and bodily gestures – in short, all 
those things by which we judge the truthfulness of a statement.5 Moreover, Corvick is the 
narrator’s “best friend” (FC 389): isn’t the narrator in a better position than the reader to 
judge if Corvick is telling the truth or not? He does briefly suspect Corvick of lying when 
Corvick and Gwendolen give conflicting accounts of their engagement, but adds that “I felt 
Corvick’s to be the one I least doubted” (385). He has a good reason to suspect that one of 
 60 
them is lying, and the very fact that he does suspect them shows that he is not utterly naive. 
He apparently does not have as good a reason to doubt Corvick about the discovery of the 
general intention. He continues to believe that Corvick, Vereker, Gwendolen and Deane are 
all telling the truth. As readers, we rely on the narrator to be our eyes and ears, and he 
reports impressions based on evidence that we do not have. His reliability is thus called 
very much into question. If he is unreliable, then his impressions of those characters are 
unreliable, and consequently the existence of the figure is called into question. 
From the opening sentence a certain amount of arrogance, bitterness, and cynicism 
seep through and set the tone of his narration: “I had done a few things and earned a few 
pence – I had perhaps even had time to begin to think I was finer than was perceived by the 
patronising” (FC 357). From that point on, the narrator proceeds to say any number of 
unpleasant things. When he is called to the bedside of his grievously ill brother, he declares 
that “what was uppermost in my mind during several anxious weeks was the sense that if 
we had only been in Paris I might have run over to see Corvick” (386). Having failed to 
name the general intention in his review, he takes consolation in the fact that Corvick too is 
“out of it” (363), and later finds “revenge” in Deane’s obsession (400). He hits his ethical 
nadir when Gwendolen steadfastly refuses to divulge the figure, and he wonders, in all 
seriousness, “if I should have to marry Mrs Corvick to get what I wanted” (391).  
The narrator also seems to have made a poor impression on the members of his 
social circle. Corvick holds the narrator’s critical abilities in low esteem, and in his capacity 
as editor at The Middle has relegated the narrator to dealing “mainly with the ladies and the 
minor poets” (FC 357). Corvick alternately accuses the narrator of being “silly” (358), 
“vulgar” and “spiteful” (371), and reports that Gwendolen was “chilled” by the narrator’s 
reluctance to share the details of his conversation with Vereker (375). Gwendolen later 
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accuses him of insulting her dead husband (392). Even Lady Jane is disappointed to find 
that the narrator is the author of the review which so aptly expresses her feelings about 
Vereker’s novels: the narrator supposes that “If the author was ‘only me’ the thing didn’t 
seem quite so remarkable” (361). 
But the other characters’ assessments of the narrator must themselves be assessed. 
Vereker, too, paints a largely unflattering portrait of the narrator, but like his oscillating 
descriptions of the general intention this portrait is a largely duplicitous one. He dismisses 
the narrator’s review as “the usual twaddle” (FC 362), but soon comments on the “spice of 
intelligence” and “exceptional sharpness” of that same review (364). He calls the narrator 
“awfully clever” (365) but then refers to his critical categories as “cheap journalese” (367). 
All this conflicting evidence must be sifted and weighed by the narrator, and his 
interpretation of what Vereker thinks of him tells us more than Vereker’s remarks 
themselves do. From these mixed messages the narrator concludes that Vereker “evidently 
didn’t think me intellectually equipped for the adventure” (373). Is this conclusion really 
Vereker’s view of the narrator, or is it merely the narrator’s view of Vereker’s view of the 
narrator? If the former, then the narrator’s reliability as an interpreter of Vereker’s novels is 
cast into doubt, while his reliability as an interpreter of Vereker is validated. If the latter, 
then Vereker may in fact think him “intellectually equipped” to discover the general 
intention.  
By themselves, the narrator’s interpretations are not sufficient proof of his reliability 
or unreliability, as we have no way of knowing if these interpretations are correct or not. He 
may strike us as a cynic for his tendency to attribute cynical motives to others. About 
Gwendolen, whom he has never met, he says “I had my ideas, which were mainly to the 
effect that Corvick would marry her if her mother would only die” (FC 358). He attributes 
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Vereker’s “usual twaddle” remark to the fact that his laudatory review “should have had a 
reserve or two” (363). When Corvick, his quest proving fruitless, stops discussing the 
general intention with him, the narrator says that “from his silence ... I had drawn a sharp 
conclusion. His courage had dropped ... he couldn’t face the triumph with which I might 
have greeted an explicit admission” (380). But do these interpretations characterize the 
narrator as a cynic, or as a remarkably perspicacious observer who is quick to recognize the 
cynical motives of others? We are rarely in a position to determine if the narrator is 
interpreting correctly or not, because we have nothing objective to compare his 
interpretations to: the tale is one long subjective interpretation.  
Ultimately, the narrator is the best judge of his own reliability. There are, in fact, 
two narrators: “The Figure in the Carpet” is a reminiscence by an older narrator who 
reports the experiences of a younger narrator who participates in the action of the story. 
Borrowing terms used by Wayne C. Booth, I will call the older narrator the observer, the 
younger the narrator-agent (153-4). The observer demonstrates a remarkable perspicacity 
in his retrospective ‘corrections’ of the narrator-agent’s ‘misinterpretations.’ I place these 
words in inverted commas because ultimately we do not know if he is righting wrong 
interpretations or wronging right ones. There is reason to put more trust in the observer, 
however, for in the interim between the events and their transcription the narrator seems to 
have grown more mature and reflective. This does not make the observer wholly reliable, as 
he himself admits: “I’m as much in the dark as ever, though I’ve grown used in a sense to 
my obtuseness” (FC 365). Through this split narrator, James is able to register both the full 
import of events as they originally appeared to the narrator-agent as well as the 
retrospective corrections of the observer. When his attempt to find the figure fails, the 
observer says: “I accounted for my confusion – perversely, I allow – by the idea that 
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Vereker had made a fool of me” (FC 370). In this sentence, the observer manages to 
interpolate the “perversely” without undermining the effect of the narrator-agent’s original 
interpretation. The apology has been tendered, but the damage is still done: it is the 
narrator-agent’s interpretation (“Vereker had made a fool of me”) that lingers in the mind 
of the reader.  
The observer admits that the narrator-agent has (or had) a tendency to ‘read into’ the 
words of the other characters when their intended meaning is less than explicit. Regarding 
the sudden termination of Corvick’s engagement, the observer says, “What I took the 
liberty of more closely inferring was that the girl might in some way have estranged him” 
(FC 379). Gwendolen is particularly unresponsive to his pleas for information: “She didn’t 
say, but I took the liberty of reading into her words”; “I read some singular things into 
Gwendolen’s words and some still more extraordinary ones into her silences” (388). He 
mentions “other things I couldn’t help believing, or at least imagining” (390) and “my false 
view of the poor man’s attitude” (399). These corrections are not without a note of remorse. 
It is the narrator-agent who feels that Corvick’s and Gwendolen’s fascination with the 
general intention “was irritating and quite envenomed my doubts”, but the observer is quick 
to add, “That statement looks unamiable, and what probably happened was that I felt 
humiliated at seeing other persons deeply beguiled by an experiment that had brought me 
only chagrin” (375).  
However, there are at least two occasions in which the narrator-agent’s 
interpretations are contradicted by ‘objective’ evidence. These misinterpretations escape the 
notice of the observer. When Gwendolen suggests that the general intention proved too 
“immense” for Corvick to send in a letter, the narrator recalls that “Vereker’s own 
statement to me was exactly that the “figure” would fit into a letter” (FC 382). But Vereker 
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did not say this. Vereker’s reply, when the narrator asks him if he would be able to clearly 
state his general intention, is “Haven’t I done it in twenty volumes?” (369). This is not so 
much a lapse of memory as it is a misinterpretation of the intended meaning of Vereker’s 
reply. The narrator can see no alternative to the referentiality of the general intention; he 
takes it so much for granted that the general intention can be stated clearly that he misses 
the implications of Vereker’s reply and reads in his own predetermined meaning. A second 
occasion is the narrator-agent’s interpretation of Corvick’s telegram: “It had for some 
persons the opposite effect, but his message may fairly be paraphrased. ‘Have patience; I 
want to see, as it breaks on you, the face you’ll make!’ ‘Tellement envie de voir ta tête!’ – 
that was what I had to sit down with” (383). Other, more literal translations of the telegram 
suggest that Corvick may indeed have intended his telegram to convey the opposite effect 
of the narrator’s paraphrase. Bromwich and Hollander translate it as “I’d so love to see your 
face!” (947), while Kermode translates it as “I long to see your face” (453). The narrator 
paraphrases his own unflagging preoccupation into a message that is, as the French 
suggests, a simple desire for reunion.  
These acts of ‘reading in,’ these interpretations which may or may not be 
misinterpretations, are simulacra of the interpretive gestures the reader performs in the 
process of making sense of the narrative. Because no proof of the general intention exists, 
the reader is required to project intentions onto the characters in order to substantiate her 
belief or disbelief in the general intention. It is only because I project an intention onto 
Corvick’s telegram that I am able to claim that the narrator misinterprets it. In the end, there 
is reason both to believe the narrator and to disbelieve him, and the reader makes this 
decision in the same way that the narrator makes his decision to believe Corvick and 
Vereker. Although the narrator has reason both to believe and to disbelieve them, he 
 65 
believes them; they apparently strike him as believable. In the same way, the narrator’s 
reliability (or Corvick’s, or Vereker’s) will depend on how he strikes the reader. The term 
‘reliability’ is of limited use here; it joins the ranks of other terms like “protagonist” (Booth 
346) and “point of view” (Bellei 98-108) which have been suggested as terms of limited 
use for the discussion of James’s works. The question Is this character reliable? begs a 
further question: Who does this character appear reliable to? It is that person, be it another 
character or a reader, whose reliability as a judge of reliability remains to be judged. 
                                                 
 
1
 Of course, what Todorov is looking for is not the ‘meaning’ of James’s tales per se, but rather a structural 
constant which can only be found “by superimposing the various works ... by reading them as if in 
transparency, one on top of the other” (Todorov 144-5). If this is an exercise in reductionism, it is an exercise 
James himself performed. In an early essay entitled “The Novels of George Eliot”, James declared that “The 
critic’s first duty in the face of an author’s collective works is to seek out some key to his method, some 
utterance of his literary convictions, some indication of his ruling theory” (LC1  912). James suggests two 
such keys to Eliot’s method, in that her “sympathies are with the common people” (913) and that in all her 
major characters “passion proves itself feebler than conscience” (915). This may seem to justify Todorov’s 
experiment, although neither the figure that Todorov finds in James nor the one James finds in Eliot may 
strike the reader as the type of thing she thinks of as the ‘meaning’ of a literary work. 
 
2 
Rimmon is here using “contradictory” to refer to the two mutually exclusive “finalized” hypotheses; 
“contrary” refers to the possible variations on each of the two contradictory hypotheses (9). 
 
3 
In Rimmon’s definition, the sjužet is a prelinguistic presentation of the fabula. She uses the term “discourse” 
for the manifestation, in language, of the sjužet. “Discourse” is reserved for her discussion of verbal, as 
opposed to narrative, ambiguity, and so does not concern us here. 
 
4 
Although not the first to suggest the ‘hallucination theory,’ Edmund Wilson’s essay “The Ambiguity of 
Henry James” (1934), a Freudian reading of the tale which presented the governess as a victim of sexual 
repression, was enormously influential (James and Beidler 130-1). 
 
5
 “The Figure in the Carpet” was written shortly after the end of James’s ill-fated excursion into dramaturgy, 
and James strove to make sure that the lessons he had learned by writing for the stage would not be wasted in 
his fiction (Kaplan 415). Just as the words in a play script are given much of their meaning by the actors who 
perform them, James’s dialogue often requires the reader to ‘act out’ the parts of his characters in order to 
determine the meaning of the words on the page. There is perhaps no better example of this than Miles’s cry 
at the end of “The Turn of the Screw”: “Peter Quint – you devil!” (Stories 740). The vocal inflection and 
blocking that the reader imaginatively provides for this line will do much to determine if it is Quint whom 
Miles addresses as a devil, or the governess. 
CHAPTER 2 
ALL WORK AND NO TEXT MAKE JACK A DULL BOY 
 
As we saw in Chapter 1, the meaning of James’s “The Figure in the Carpet” is to a 
large extent predetermined by the reader’s definition of ‘meaning.’ Depending on which 
definition they championed, the critics surveyed saw the tale either as an indictment of the 
obsessive quest for an author’s intention, as the celebration of an ineffable experience of 
meaning, or as a wholly ambiguous narrative whose meaning can only rest in the 
impossibility of determining what ‘really happens.’ I concluded that the tale does not 
implicitly vindicate or indict any of the characters or their respective interpretive 
approaches, but rather, depending on the reader’s critical perspective, can be seen to 
vindicate or indict any one of them.  
This conclusion, of course, is largely predetermined by my decision to use the tale 
as an illustration of the battle for supremacy between the three poles of author, text, and 
reader; and, as Stanley Fish argues, this distinction between these three poles is finally 
specious. The debate between the three poles of meaning presupposes three discrete 
categories which, rather than existing prior to and independently of interpretation, are in 
fact the products of interpretation (16-7). The notion of three discrete categories falsely 
suggests that the reader, explicitly or implicitly, chooses between them in the process of 
determining the meaning of a work. Readers do not choose to understand a work in a 
particular way -- they simply understand it. Even Corvick, an ardent intentionalist, does not 
choose how he will understand the novels. Corvick is an experienced critic, and if what he 
was looking for was a meaning, he could have simply elaborated one of his hypotheses into 
a cohesive and credible explanation of Vereker’s novels. He could have done this with not 
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just one hypothesis but with any number of them. What Corvick is searching for, however, 
is the meaning, and when he finds it this meaning is not a choice but an inevitability. 
Although he chooses Vereker’s intention as the thing to look for, the meaning he finds is 
not determined by Vereker’s intention: Corvick is sure of his discovery even before 
Vereker confirms it. The reason he is so sure is that, once he discovers it, the general 
intention is obvious: “Nothing, in especial, once you were face to face with it, could show 
for more consummately done. When once it came out it came out, was there with a 
splendour that made you ashamed; and there hadn’t been ... the smallest reason why it 
should have been overlooked” (FC 384-5).  
But the narrator and Lady Jane arrive at understandings which, to them, are just as 
obvious. This, Fish suggests, is due to the seemingly paradoxical fact that a text may have 
more than one literal meaning (268-92). The reader always approaches the text with certain 
presuppositions about its purposes and concerns, and within those presuppositions the 
meaning of the work appears obvious. Not all readers begin with the same presuppositions, 
however, and so the word ‘literal,’ rather than referring to any single, absolute meaning, 
refers to the variety of single meanings the text has for a variety of readers. “There always 
is a literal meaning because in any situation there is always a meaning that seems obvious 
in the sense that it is there independently of anything we might do. But that only means that 
we have already done it, and in another situation, when we have already done something 
else, there will be another obvious, that is, literal, meaning” (276).  
The key word here is already. One point of disagreement between Fish and E.D. 
Hirsch is the matter of when the meaning of a text is determined. Hirsch divides the process 
of interpretation into two stages or “moments”: the divinatory moment is “unmethodical, 
intuitive, sympathetic; it is an imaginative guess without which nothing can begin.” The 
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critical moment submits the divinatory moment “to a “high intellectual standard” by testing 
it against all the relevant knowledge available” (Validity x). The function of the divinatory 
moment is to produce an understanding, while the function of the critical moment is to 
bring this understanding into agreement with the meaning the author probably intended. 
This necessitates a certain self-consciousness on the reader’s part: a preliminary 
understanding of a work (word, sentence) is scrutinized, and then, after some weighing of 
evidence, either confirmed or rejected. But reading is not the self-conscious act Hirsch’s 
model requires. According to Fish, the act of reading and the determination of meaning 
occur simultaneously:  
one hears an utterance within, and not as preliminary to determining, a knowledge 
of its purposes and concerns ... to so hear it is already to have assigned it a shape 
and given it a meaning. In other words, the problem of how meaning is determined 
is only a problem if there is a point at which its determination has not yet been 
made, and I am saying that there is no such point. (310) 
 
The reader does not self-consciously scrutinize the accuracy of her guess, because the 
meaning she construes is not a guess at all. If it were a guess, the reader would know to test 
it against the high intellectual standard Hirsch speaks of. Fish’s argument suggests that the 
reader never has the opportunity to choose between the possible meanings of a text (or 
between the three poles which would govern that choice) because the very act of reading 
constitutes that choice. Strictly speaking, there is no choice at all. The reader simply always 
understands the literal meaning of the text. 
Consider, for example, a reader who encounters the line “Our own God gave us, 
gave us the bird” from James Tate’s poem “With a Child All Day” (Selected 170; see 
Appendix). The meaning of this line seems obvious; there appears to be only one thing the 
line can mean, and therefore there is no reason to submit this “imaginative guess” to a 
critical moment. A second reader, however, may be aware that ‘the bird’ is an idiomatic 
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expression for that time-honored gesture otherwise known as ‘the finger.’ While this 
expression is commonly known within the late-twentieth-century North American milieu in 
which Tate is writing, it is by no means universal, and I would not be surprised to find that 
many readers of Tate’s poem were unfamiliar with it. One may object that this second 
meaning is obscure, and that it is somewhat unfair of Tate not to clarify such an obscure 
meaning in his poem. But there is no guarantee that this is Tate’s meaning. Tate might have 
had a more familiar species of bird in mind, a pigeon or a hawk or something. In which 
case it is the ‘finger’ reading which is obscure, and we could argue that by proposing it the 
second reader is not adequately participating in the conventions of language and literary 
interpretation. But the second meaning is conventional, although not as conventional as the 
first one, and raises the question I posed in Chapter 1 as to just how conventional a 
meaning must be, in Hirsch’s theory, in order for it to qualify as the verbal meaning of the 
work. Just as it would be impossible for the first reader to arrive at the ‘finger’ reading of 
Tate’s line, it would be equally impossible for the second reader to arrive at the ‘pigeon’ 
reading. The second reader will be able to ‘see’ this meaning, of course, but she will not be 
able to see it as the meaning; such a reading will strike her as too literal and naive. It is at 
this point that we usually conclude that such a line is ambiguous. If so, it is no more or less 
ambiguous than the line “These fragments I have shored against my ruins” from Eliot’s 
“The Waste Land” (2526). If I take this line to be quite obvious in its single, literal 
meaning, it is only because I cannot even imagine that the line could possibly mean 
anything else. To the reader who can conceive the obvious second meaning, however, my 
reading will seem impossibly naive.  
If the critical moment submits the meanings produced in the divinatory moment to a 
high intellectual standard, it only submits those meanings which the reader is capable of 
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divining in the first place. If none of these divinatory moments coincide with the author’s 
intention, then no amount of critical scrutiny will produce the meaning the author 
‘probably’ intended. This suggests that the misinterpretation of an author’s intention is not 
simply a matter of incorrectly choosing a meaning from an array of possible meanings, all 
of which are known to the reader. Misinterpretation may be the result of an incorrect 
choice: I may interpret the word ‘lap’ as the part of the body created when someone sits 
down rather than, as the author intended, the trip a swimmer makes from one end of a pool 
to the other. But misinterpretation may also occur when the author’s intended meaning does 
not exist among the array of meanings already familiar to the reader. It never occurs to the 
reader that there is another meaning which she does not know.  
A critical moment would only be activated if the reader felt a need to subject her 
understanding to one, if she had some cause for doubt. Consider, for example, the 
interpretive fiasco that can occur when a teenage reader comes across the word 
‘intercourse’ in some Victorian novel. Knowing only a single definition of the word 
‘intercourse,’ the reader naturally concludes that a sexual act is taking place, and she 
continues to read the novel in the light of this understanding. But when no further reference 
to this sexual relationship is made she may begin to question her understanding, and 
hopefully, if she cares enough, she will retrace her steps to the source of her confusion and 
search for an alternative definition of ‘intercourse.’ When she finds one, she realizes her 
mistake and revises her understanding. This kind of retrospective correction, of course, 
requires a perspicacious reader; a different reader may simply rearrange her understanding 
of the novel in order to accommodate the sexual act rather than question her original 
understanding of the word.  
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 There are, however, situations in which a text is not already understood as 
something, in which the critical moment is prompted before the understanding is construed. 
I recently taught a class in which there was some disagreement over the following lines 
from Yeats’s “Easter 1916”:  
That woman’s days were spent 
In ignorant good-will, 
Her nights in argument 
Until her voice grew shrill. 
What voice more sweet than hers 
When, young and beautiful, 
She rode to harriers? (Yeats 178) 
 
The difficulty we had in construing the sense of these lines centered around the meaning of 
the word ‘harriers,’ which has several definitions. I saw the harriers as rabbit-hunting dogs: 
that young and beautiful woman went out on the fox hunt, riding along with the harriers. I 
found support for this image in the man who “rode our wingèd horse” in the following 
lines. One of my students saw the harriers as members of an opposing political faction who 
harried, or attacked, that woman during her nights of argument. She “rode to” these 
harriers, harrying them in turn with her own shrill attack. Other students proposed credible 
readings based on other definitions. In this case the critical moment was only prompted 
because the intended meaning of the word had not already been determined. No one in the 
class suggested that the word ‘argument’ be construed as “the angle that fixes the direction 
of a complex number” (Webster’s 60) because no one had any doubt about the intended 
meaning of that word. Within the context – or what was understood to be the context -- the 
word ‘argument’ made perfect sense. The word ‘harriers’ could not immediately make 
sense, because nobody in the class came to the poem with even a single definition of the 
word. If we had all been equipped with poor-quality dictionaries which gave only a single 
definition, we most likely would not have had any difficulty incorporating that definition 
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into the context of the poem; the possibilities for interpretation would be constrained by the 
possible definitions of the word. As it was, we had a choice of definitions, and the meaning 
was determined on the basis of the definition that made the most sense within the context. 
Once a definition that made sense was found, that definition became the literal meaning of 
the word, although different people found different literal meanings. I personally did not 
self-consciously run through the lines with each of the several definitions of ‘harriers,’ 
because as soon as I found a definition that made perfect sense, I understood it as the literal 
meaning. This illustrates Fish’s claim that “intention is known when and only when it is 
recognized; it is recognized as soon as you decide about it; you decide about it as soon as 
you make a sense; and you make a sense ... as soon as you can” (164). 
 One will notice from the above examples that the determination of meaning was 
automatically equated with the determination of the author’s intention. In a manner of 
speaking, the reader is always seeking the author’s intention. Hirsch says that “If a text 
means what it says, then it means nothing in particular. Its saying has no determinate 
existence but must be the saying of the author or a reader” (Validity 13). This was 
particularly true in the case of the Yeats poem. At a first reading, the word ‘harriers’ meant 
nothing in particular. Its meaning had to come from somewhere, but to claim that it came 
from either the author or the reader is inaccurate. When the dictionary provides multiple 
definitions for a word, the reader does not arbitrarily select a definition, although, if she 
tried, she could most likely make any definition function within the context. Rather, she 
selects the definition that makes the most sense. That she does this suggests that she is 
always seeking what the word really means, which is to say, an authorized or intended 
meaning of the word. But the reader does not self-consciously test her understanding 
against the probable intention of the author: she immediately understands the text in this 
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way because she assumes that this is the way the text is meant to be understood. To say that 
she chooses the reading that makes the most sense to her is simply to say that she chooses 
the reading that makes the most sense. If for some reason she disregards the reading that 
makes the most sense, she can only do so because she knows which reading that is. As far 
as I know, readers do not do this. The reader does not choose to read the text incorrectly; 
she does not bracket a correct reading to which her own reading is an alternative. She may 
argue that the text is ambiguous, that it provides sufficient grounds for at least two different 
readings; but in this case the ambiguity becomes the intended meaning, the reading that 
makes the most sense.  
The remaining possibility is that the reader has no divinatory moment, that she 
cannot even make an “imaginative guess” about the meaning. For example, I have no idea 
what Eliot means by the line “O O O O that Shakespeherian Rag” (Waste 2516). 
“Shakespeherian” appears to be a bastardized form of ‘Shakespearean,’ while a “Rag” 
could be either a newspaper of dubious worth or the type of piano composition popularized 
by Scott Joplin. An interesting array of meanings could be constructed from even these few 
possibilities, but if these meanings constitute imaginative guesses, they are not credible 
guesses. There is nothing in the context of the poem to recommend any one of them as the 
meaning of the line, none of them makes any more sense than the others or strikes me as 
something that could be referred to as “so elegant” or “So intelligent” (2516). There is a 
difference between the guesses my class made about ‘harriers’ and my guess about Eliot’s 
line. Although our guesses about ‘harriers’ were never submitted to a critical moment, each 
understood her guess as the literal meaning of the word. In short, they were not guesses at 
all. But my guesses about Eliot’s line are so many shots in the dark: I do not understand any 
of them as the literal meaning.  
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None of this is terribly distressing; we can simply say that I have not understood 
Eliot’s line. But I always understand something, even if what I understand is that I have no 
idea what the words mean. It would perhaps be more descriptive to say that I have not 
realized Eliot’s line. No conceptual content has been assigned to the words, they have not 
been realized as an image, an idea or an emotion. In semiotic terminology, the signifier has 
not been linked to a signified.1 My understanding of “The Waste Land” consists of both the 
lines I have realized (“These fragments I have shored against my ruins”) and those I have 
not (“Shakespeherian Rag”). It is important to emphasize that, in the case of 
“Shakespeherian Rag”, it is not that I am unable to realize the words (I have suggested 
some possible realizations above), but that I have not already done so. Entire works may be 
unrealized in the sense that, although the semantic sense of the words has been construed, 
the reader is unable to organize the semantic sense into some kind of total meaning - in 
short, she does not ‘get’ the poem, she does not understand what the poem is ‘trying to 
say.’  
The reader will please take this distinction between realized and unrealized lines as 
highly provisional. Although preferable to saying that the reader has ‘not understood,’ such 
a clear-cut distinction is bound to oversimplify the cognitive nuances of the process of 
constructing textual meaning. That being said, I will draw a further highly provisional 
distinction between two kinds of realization, which I will call intuitive and cognitive. Like 
Hirsch’s divinatory moment, an intuitive realization has no methodology: one simply ‘gets’ 
the poem. An intuitive realization cannot be taken for granted, of course. If the reader does 
not ‘get’ the poem, she will have to construct the meaning through an act of deliberate, 
conscious cognition. If she has not already made coherent sense of the poem, if she has not 
already organized it under some paradigm, she can impose a paradigm, she can consciously 
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and willfully impose a meaning onto the poem. According to Fish, defenders of determinate 
meaning like Hirsch use this word ‘impose’ as a pejorative term for the critical tendency to 
inflict an idiosyncratic meaning onto a poem, in callous disregard of the obvious meaning 
(306). Fish rejects the word because it implies an act of conscious will that is simply not the 
case. Readers do not first scrutinize the poem and then assign it a meaning; rather, the 
meaning has already been assigned as the poem is being read. But Fish does not consider 
the exceptions to the rule. In cases where the meaning has not already been assigned (as 
was my experience with “Shakespeherian Rag”), the reader certainly can impose a 
meaning, and may very well do so. A cognitive realization is a willful imposition of 
meaning, it is methodically produced through conscious rational thought. It is a creative act, 
a matter of imagining a context in which all the textual elements function. It is a way of 
rationalizing the poem.2 
We could say that while an intuitive realization is ineffable, a cognitive realization 
exists only in language; it is realization as an articulation. We can, of course, make the 
gesture of articulating an intuitive realization. In that gesture, however, a transformation 
occurs: irrational meanings are rationalized or abandoned, ineffable meanings are altered, 
reduced or left out altogether. At the same time, the resources of language allow previously 
nonexistent meanings to come into being. The realization is in effect translated from the 
intuitive mode to the cognitive. This is the logical consequence of the bi-level model of 
interpretation discussed in Chapter 1, in which a pre-linguistic understanding is expressed 
in a linguistic articulation. Terry Eagleton rejects this bi-level model of meaning. For 
Eagleton, all meaning exists in language: “Perhaps the reader would care to experiment 
here by looking up from the book for a moment and ‘meaning’ something silently in his or 
her head. What did you ‘mean’? And was it different from the words in which you have just 
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formulated the response?” (67-8). This experiment is fine if one limits meaning to 
something which is consciously willed. For Eagleton, the noun ‘meaning’ is correlative 
with the verb ‘to mean’ in the sense of ‘to will’ or ‘to intend.’ But everyone understands 
meanings which they do not will – emotions, for example – and one of the things that 
authors do is attempt to express such meanings, “to generate semiotic equivalents for 
experiences that seem to defy duplication in mere signs” (Scholes 35). 
For most readers, there is no obligation to realize a poem. If an intuitive realization 
is not achieved, the reader is free to simply concede her confusion and stop reading. 
However, some of us (students, critics, professors) cannot afford this concession. Faced 
with a difficult literary work on the one hand and the obligation to articulate an 
understanding of it on the other, we sometimes turn to a particular critical theory as a 
convenient, available way of explaining the work, a ‘lens’ through which what was 
previously invisible now comes into view, not unlike 3-D glasses. The bemused literature 
student can take comfort in “the idea of a method whose procedures, like a cooking recipe, 
can be repeated mechanically and which no work can “resist[...]”” (Harari 11), while 
critical methodologies or ‘approaches’ can be praised for “dealing with texts that are 
exceedingly resistant to interpretation”.3 As these texts were presumably written to resist 
interpretation, the ability of the critical methodology to ‘deal with’ them does not 
necessarily constitute a benefit to the text. Nor is dealing with the text the proper function 
of criticism. Jonathan Culler claims that 
courses in which students read theorists as a series of ‘approaches’ to literary works 
are predicated on two interconnected but fallacious assumptions: that the function of 
literary theory is to make possible better interpretations of literary works; and that 
one cannot become a skilled interpreter without being exposed to the principal 
writings in literary theory. (220) 
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Even the notion of a ‘skilled interpreter’ is predicated on an assumption which must be 
questioned. What function does an interpretation serve? What can a skilled interpreter do 
that an unskilled interpreter cannot? A skilled interpreter of a road map is able to determine 
the shortest route between one city and another, and we call her a skilled interpreter 
because we agree that a primary function of the road map is to suggest the shortest route 
between one city and another. But one may also read a road map for the pleasure to be had 
in locating one’s own city, in dreaming of the places one would like to visit, or in reflecting 
on how big the world is. In these cases the ability to determine the shortest route between 
two cities is irrelevant.  
The two assumptions Culler mentions suggest potentially devastating consequences. 
First, the importance placed on interpretation in the classroom may make the student feel 
that, whatever her understanding is, it is worth nothing unless she is able to articulate it 
intelligently. As we saw in the cases of Gwendolen and Lady Jane, an understanding may 
be ineffable and be no less an understanding for that. Attempting to articulate an ineffable 
experience of meaning, the student may be tempted to quote Emily Dickinson and say that 
the work made her feel as if the top of her head was being taken off. This is undoubtedly a 
powerful experience of meaning, and yet this kind of impressionistic remark is deemed, in 
most cases, inappropriate for the classroom. One can imagine the student with the ineffable 
understanding constructing a second understanding for the purposes of classroom 
discussion, a ‘social’ understanding to complement the ‘private’ understanding she reserves 
for home use.  
Second, the notion that interpretive skill depends upon a knowledge of criticism 
suggests a ‘critical fallacy’ which turns the critical work into a necessary supplement of the 
literary work, to the extent that Edmund Wilson’s article is a necessary supplement of “The 
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Turn of the Screw” or Stuart Gilbert’s book is a necessary supplement for any student who 
wonders which chapter of Ulysses is being referred to as the “Nausicaa” episode.4 This 
critical fallacy can be extended to refer to any text or branch of learning posited as a 
prerequisite for understanding a particular literary work. It has been said that the body of 
knowledge required “to fully understand Ulysses” includes “the theology of the Roman 
Catholic Church, the history of heresy, Irish legend, European history, mythology, 
astronomy, Hebrew, Latin, Gaelic, and Gypsy slang” (Ulysses 1008). Although these 
branches of learning can certainly be acquired by those willing to acquire them, other types 
of knowledge, such as the context of knowledge Corvick’s discovery of the general 
intention hinges on, cannot be purchased for the price of a Harvard education or even a bus 
ride to the public library; and yet they may be equally relevant to Joyce’s novel. By the 
logic of the critical fallacy any body of knowledge could be considered a prerequisite for 
understanding. A previous experience of suicidal depression would be a prerequisite for 
understanding The Bell Jar, and a previous experience of racial prejudice would be a 
prerequisite for understanding Invisible Man. Any author would be a damned fool if she 
expected her readers to come equipped with all the knowledge potentially relevant to her 
work, and as far as I know authors expect nothing of the kind. All knowledge is potentially 
relevant. Culler claims that although a knowledge of theory may contribute to a student’s 
understanding of literature, “so may immersion in history, philosophy, astrology, or a love 
affair” (220). No reader can possess all the contexts of knowledge, and literary criticism 
does not have a monopoly on the contexts of knowledge relevant to the literary work. When 
the reader articulates her understanding of a literary work, she cannot help but speak from 
within a context of knowledge, as such a context is supplied by her previous experience of 
life – the very experience which, presumably, authors speak to.  
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An understanding, in my use of the term, does not preclude the application of any 
context of knowledge, literary-critical or otherwise; it simply proceeds on the basis of 
whatever contexts of knowledge are ready-to-hand. The reader may, for example, be well-
schooled in Freudian psychoanalysis. If she now finds herself required to write a final paper 
on Ulysses, she does not choose to read Joyce through the ‘lens’ of Freudian 
psychoanalysis because she thinks it will produce a good interpretation; rather, Freudian 
psychoanalysis is so much a part of the way she looks at the world that she can’t help but 
read Joyce this way. She may not even be aware that she is ‘using’ Freud, for Freud’s ideas 
have become her ideas. She is only ‘using’ herself; she is understanding. Criticism should 
not be seen as a body of knowledge necessary for the understanding of literature, but as an 
independent discipline designed to cultivate the student’s conceptual knowledge, in the 
continuing presumption that knowledgeable students make better readers.  
The reader may fail to realize parts of the work, but this risk is immanent regardless 
of whatever knowledge the reader may possess. Everybody knows that literature is difficult. 
But rather than asking to be ‘dealt with,’ the work seems to ask the reader to leave the 
unrealized parts alone, to give herself time to adjust to the strangeness of the language, to 
be willing to ‘not understand.’ For this reason I argue against critical approaches which 
systematize interpretation and provide a way to generate explanations for the text. Through 
the application of a critical approach the reader achieves closure on the work: the work 
again becomes an item for consumption. A work that is only partly realized remains open, 
and the reader is called back to the work in order to resolve the unrealized parts. Unrealized 
parts add texture to a work: they are latencies of meaning which at any moment can burst 
open and bring new life to the work by radically altering or augmenting our previous 
understanding. But even a fully-realized work is never closed in any permanent sense. 
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Although not exactly sealed, the fully-realized work lies dormant. It itself cannot change, 
but instead awaits a change in the reader. As the reader acquires new contexts of 
knowledge, she can return to the work to understand it in new ways. This is not only 
possible but inevitable, provided that the reader returns to the work. 
Unrealized parts of a work do not prevent the reader from articulating her 
understanding. She can articulate those parts of the work she has realized, while those she 
has not will not necessarily prejudice her ‘total’ understanding of the work. Critics 
frequently leave parts of works unexplained, or else offer provisional explanations by 
saying something like “Could it be that...” or “Is it possible that....” Presumably, this is the 
critic’s way of saying that although she wants to suggest this clever reading, she isn’t 
entirely convinced of it. The reader can also articulate the function that the dark spots play 
– how they contribute to her understanding of the poem as a whole. Although I do not 
know what “Shakespeherian Rag” means, the fact that I do not know what it means is part 
of my understanding of “The Waste Land”. This is nothing more than Fish’s 
recommendation to replace the question “what does this sentence mean?” with the question 
“what does this sentence do?” (25). 
Admittedly, the distinction between realized and unrealized parts is situated within a 
traditional model of literature which presupposes that the goal of reading is to attain a lucid 
and cohesive ‘total’ understanding of the work. While there are cogent arguments for this 
model, other equally compelling models have been suggested. Roland Barthes argues that, 
in opposition to the traditional literary work, recent changes in our thinking about language 
and literature necessitate a new literary object, which he calls the Text. By the logic of the 
work the reader is seen as the interpreter of a meaning which has its origins in the work’s 
historical and racial milieu, its literary lineage, and the author’s intentions. The Text rejects 
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these determinations: it is “read without the father’s signature” (Barthes 78). Rather than 
zeroing in on a signified, the Text is seen as a play of signifiers which explode in a 
constantly proliferating multiplicity of meaning. This new notion of the Text demands a 
new practice of reading: rather than simply presenting a fully formulated meaning to be 
passively consumed, the Text asks for the reader’s active collaboration in the construction 
of meaning. It asks the reader to execute the text, “produce the text, play it, open it out, 
make it go” (80).  
The major advantage of Barthes’s approach is that it precludes the closure of the 
literary work. Barthes rightly argues against reading as consuming: literature is not a bag of 
potato chips one rips open, devours the contents of and throws away. On the other hand, 
while Barthes’s approach creates a new interpretive goal, it precludes other equally 
valuable goals. The magnificent meanings found by the characters in James’s tale, for 
example, are clearly the results of reading Vereker’s novels as works rather than as Texts. 
Corvick seems less interested in the play of signifiers than in determining one, final, 
authoritative signified. Also, as the Text “exists only as discourse” (Barthes 75), it would 
seem impossible to understand it as an ineffable experience of meaning. It is also difficult 
to imagine the reader ‘losing herself’ in the Text, because she is always aware of herself as 
the producer of meaning: like Brecht’s epic theatre, with its deliberate alienation of the 
audience, the Text is constantly calling attention to its own artificiality. Barthes points out, 
however, that some literature can only be experienced as work (80), and he does not imply 
that the meanings produced from a Text are necessarily ‘better’ than those produced from a 
work. 
Although Barthes emphasizes that the distinction between works and Texts is not 
determined by their chronological situation (74), the literary innovations of the last fifty 
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years clearly demonstrate the urgency of a new approach to the literary work. Authors have 
felt this urgency as much as the critics. In an interview from the mid-Seventies, James Tate 
expresses the need for “a criticism that can speak intelligently of the new poetry, the poetry 
of the last fifteen years .... the previous criticism was completely outdated. It was written by 
critics who were unaware of the discoveries and techniques of the new poets” (Route 51). 
An apt candidate for the Barthesian Text, Tate’s poem “The Figure in the Carpet” (Shroud 
59-60; see Appendix) is a verse adaptation of James’s tale which gives another turn of the 
screw to the theme of authorial intention. Several lines in the poem recall the conversation 
between Vereker and the narrator: we have the same quest for an intention in line 8, in 
which somebody “would like to know what is on our minds”; we have the possibility of the 
revelation of secrets, presumably secrets about the intention (20); and somebody has asked 
for a clue, presumably a clue to the secrets about the intention (27). The speaker who is 
keeping the secrets is clearly some kind of artificer, and the work he has created is both 
“seductive” and “incomprehensible.” Like Corvick, the speaker who seeks the intention has 
discovered in the work a sense of meaningfulness which he would like to be able to put into 
words.  
The grammar suggests that there are two speakers in the poem. The first speaker, 
the speaker of lines 1-14, speaks entirely in the first person plural. He is, apparently, 
speaking to someone, but this is never finally clear. When he says “we would like to know 
what is on our minds” (8), we are confronted with three possibilities: (a) the “we” is a 
straight plural. The line may be paraphrased as “we both have something on our minds, and 
we both would like to know what that is.” (b) the “we” is the royal “we” – the speaker 
grandiosely refers to himself in the first person plural. The line may be paraphrased as “I 
would like to know what is on my mind.” (c) the “we” is an ironic riposte to a second 
 83 
person. The line may be paraphrased as “you would like to know what is on my mind when 
I organize these shadows.”  
In line 15 a second speaker appears. This speaker refers to himself as “I” and to the 
first speaker as “you” and “Binky.” We remain with the second speaker through the end of 
the poem. A third character is introduced, a silent witness, the addressee of the lines “And 
if there are they best be espied/ over at Binky’s place, his rotunda has a view of some” (22-
3). The distinction between the two speakers is only provisional, however. Nothing clearly 
marks a shift from one speaker to the next; either speaker could theoretically be speaking at 
any time, and the silent witness may in fact be yet another speaker. We cannot even be 
certain about the number of characters: the royal “we” opens the possibility that the poem is 
a monologue, that a single “Binky” indiscriminately refers to himself in the first, second 
and third person.  
Largely for these reasons is the poem forbidding, even “incomprehensible”, and in 
order to make some sense of it the reader is not only invited but required to impose some 
kind of situational context. Although the poem makes no explicit reference to an author or a 
critic, the surface similarities between Tate’s work and James’s substantiate our importing 
the framework from James’s narrative. We can construct a scenario in which the first 
speaker is an author, a poet. This poet is clearly in his twilight years, having spent the better 
part of his creative endowment, and is now settling down to a life of undemanding  “useful 
tasks” and uneventful “mildly good times” (2). Even the poems he continues to write are 
“not a big effort” (5). The bewildered poet questions the critic’s guesses about the meaning 
of the poems – “a maze?” (9); “a slumber party?” (10); these guesses are reminiscent of the 
reductive meanings proposed by the narrator of James’s tale. In lines 8-14 the poet seems 
also to be speaking of his own attitude toward the poems: if for the critic the poems are 
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seductive yet incomprehensible, for the poet the poems are “shadows” in which he loses 
any sense of self. The implication is that the poet has been writing the poems in an attempt 
to elude the selves which “have been following us/ and pestering us all these years” (12-
13).  
The shift to the second speaker, the critic, comes in an ironic allegation about the 
poet’s psychological health: “Oh you talk a good game, Binky. I can see/ that you have a 
nervous system shaped like Florida” (15-16). The critic, while he suspects that the poet’s 
melodramatic description of his poems reveals some kind of psychological disturbance, 
also implies that this description is mere affectation on the poet’s part. The following lines 
(17-8) suggest the imminence of the poet’s death – the return to the place he was before he 
was born – but are to some extent undermined by the following line: “Did I say egg? I 
meant dog” (19). This line could be taken to suggest the poet’s belief about the nature of 
death, reflecting the belief of certain South American Indian cultures that when the body 
dies a dog leads the spirit into the afterlife. Dogs are frequent denizens of Tate’s poems, 
often seen as traversing the boundary between life and death. Joshua Clover sees the 
recurring motif as various appearances of a single dog who travels through the body of 
Tate’s work, fulfilling various obligations, “including surviving its own funeral” (65). This 
line can also be read as a monkey wrench thrown by Tate into the reader’s attempt to make 
sense of the poem: in an ironic comment on the intentional fallacy, Tate suggests that what 
is said is not necessarily what is meant. As it is the critic and not the poet who speaks the 
line, this ironic comment is a role-reversal of the poet-critic relationship, the critic giving 
the poet a taste of his own medicine. 
Seeing that no secrets are forthcoming, the critic takes up a trivial but practical task 
(20-1). The next lines mark the shift in address: the critic now refers to the poet, Binky, in 
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the third person. The critic appears to be addressing the silent witness at this point, but 
another possibility is that the critic, still addressing the poet, is referring to a third person 
who, like the poet, is named Binky. This suggestion will seem less outlandish if we recall 
the two Quentins in Faulkner’s The Sound and the Fury. By introducing a second Binky, 
Tate would be throwing yet another monkey wrench into the interpretive works, although 
perhaps simultaneously sympathizing with the reader’s indignation over being deliberately 
misled by the author.  
If secrets are espied, then “it won’t follow us” (24). This “it” could refer to the 
“selves” which were following and pestering in lines 12-13, or, in keeping with the rule of 
pronoun agreement, to the dog in line 19. If the dog is indeed the poet’s guide into the 
afterlife, then the spying of secrets – the critic’s comprehension of the poet’s work – will 
send the dog away and thus prolong the poet’s life. This suggests the traditional notion that 
an author gains immortality through his work, and could explain why the incubators in line 
26 are no longer necessary: the poet no longer needs to nurse his “shadows”, as they have 
found a guardian in the now-comprehending critic. There is a more obvious link, of course, 
between the incubators and the egg in lines 18-19, and I wouldn’t bet money on this 
‘immortality’ interpretation. The last line, presuming that the critic is still the speaker, can 
suggest either that a clue has been given, so that the line would be taken to imply “That 
wasn’t so hard, was it?”; or that a clue has been refused, so that the implication would be 
“It doesn’t hurt to ask.”  
Clearly I have not already understood the literal meaning of this poem. There is so 
much ambiguity about speakers, addressees, pronoun referents and local intentions that 
Tate seems to have been at pains to prevent the reader from arriving at a literal meaning. 
Even by self-consciously constructing the meaning I am still unable to arrive at any 
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cohesive reading. I can realize the lines, but I realize them in too many ways at once. The 
poem does not follow through on any of these realizations; each one undermines the others. 
While James’s “The Figure in the Carpet” suggests a variety of readings, it is at least 
possible to read the tale consistently as one thing or another. Tate’s poem also suggests a 
variety of meanings, but prevents us from reading it consistently in any one way. His poem 
is a meaning-making machine that turns on but won’t turn off, churning out new meanings, 
each new meaning destroying the meanings already produced.  
If pressed to do so, the best ‘general intention’ I could propose is that Tate’s “The 
Figure in the Carpet” is meant as both a parody of the critic who would hunt the author 
down and demand to know “what is on our minds,” and as a self-parody, a reaction against 
the willful obscurity of authors. This recalls Fred Kaplan’s interpretation of James’s tale, 
quoted in Chapter 1, and we could do worse than call Tate’s poem “an ironic expression of 
some of the frustration he felt being viewed as a writer of “difficult” works when he 
himself believed his [works] were absolutely lucid” (Kaplan 412). In this light, Tate’s 
adaptation of James’s tale can be seen as simply following the conventions of the figure-in-
the-carpet ‘genre.’ The poem also proves a nice complement to the earlier work, furnishing 
a piece of the puzzle missing from James’s tale: as if the tale itself didn’t already put the 
reader through the interpretive gestures demanded of Corvick and the narrator, Tate’s poem 
is a simulacrum, not of Vereker’s oeuvre (which has, after all, been solved), but of 
Vereker’s oeuvre as it appears to the narrator: the reader of the poem is given some idea of 
how frustrating the narrator’s quest for the general intention is -- believing that a meaning 
can be found, yet being unable to find it. 
We can see from the above paragraph just how easy it is to construct a reading 
which rationalizes the poem. Although I was unable to achieve any literal meaning, any 
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intuitive realization, I simply take a step back and imagine a wider context in which all the 
unrealized parts of the poem are gathered together under the umbrella of a single meaning. 
Tate’s poem is not unlike the late works of Monet: if one stands too closely to the canvas, 
all one can see are streaks of color, none of which represent anything. By taking a few steps 
back, these streaks of color are gathered together into a lily pond or the Rouen cathedral. 
Tate’s poem can now be seen to be about its own lack of meaning: by refusing to mean in 
any consistent way the poem forces me to think about its function and challenge my 
tendency to search for consistent meanings. This, of course, becomes Tate’s intention in the 
poem. While this seems paradoxical, such paradoxes are a widely-acknowledged feature of 
Tate’s poems. James Harms points out that “part of the point of a Tate poem – which is to 
impose upon this master of the seemingly pointless a somewhat contradictory purpose – is 
to frustrate interpretation” (82). 
And yet, I am dissatisfied. I don’t believe in my reading. A poem is like pie dough: 
the more you handle it, the less palatable the results are. Failing to find the literal meaning 
of the poem, I have self-consciously labored to construct something which can properly be 
called a reading. In an epigraph to Chapter 1 of Validity in Interpretation, Hirsch quotes 
Northrop Frye to make the point that we never actually find the meaning of a work: “It has 
been said of Boehme that his books are like a picnic to which the author brings the words 
and the reader the meaning. The remark may have been intended as a sneer at Boehme, but 
it is an exact description of all works of literary art without exception” (1). The implication 
of Frye’s remark is that, although it is inherent in the act of reading, this division of labor 
between author and reader normally passes unperceived by the reader. Although she brings 
the meaning to the picnic, the reader believes that she has arrived empty-handed and that 
the meaning is waiting for her when she sits down. Tate’s poem, however, foregrounds the 
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division of labor: all pretensions to an intended meaning are dropped, and the reader is 
made well aware that whatever meaning she gets from the poem will not be the author’s 
meaning but her own.  
In Chapter 1 I referred to the ‘puzzle model’ of interpretation, according to which 
the reader’s sole obligation is to extract the author’s intended meaning from the ‘disguised’ 
version of that meaning represented by the work. According to this model, the work is like 
a jigsaw puzzle. A jigsaw puzzle has but one correct solution, and once this solution has 
been found there is little left to do with the puzzle but congratulate oneself on one’s own 
diligence in solving it. The division of labor Frye speaks of suggests a second ‘puzzle 
model’ which, like the first, turns the poem into a superfluous object. In the second puzzle 
model, the poem is like one of those magnetic poetry kits one buys for the refrigerator door, 
each magnet inscribed with a different ‘poetic’ word, moon, summer, love, and so forth. 
The magnetic poetry kit cannot mean anything by itself, but the words can be rearranged 
into countless meaningful units through the participation of the ‘poet.’ While Frye suggests 
that this second puzzle model obtains as a matter of course but unbeknownst to the reader, 
Barthes suggests we adopt this model as a conscious, deliberate approach to the Text. This 
approach is certainly liberating, but it also presents some serious disadvantages. If there is 
no intended meaning to be communicated, and reading is simply an exercise of my own 
skill in constructing meaning, then the poem has nothing unique to offer me. I can perform 
the same interpretive gestures with a newspaper, a philosophical treatise or the text on a 
cereal box. This is not reading poetry at all, as there is nothing to read. I do not ‘produce’ 
the poem in the metaphorical sense implied by Barthes: I quite literally produce the poem 
myself. 
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Theorists are constantly warning us about the dangers of solipsism in interpretation. 
The strongest argument for critical approaches is that, as they are based on collectively-
developed theories which address universal social or physical phenomena, they engage me 
in a broader discourse and prevent me from arriving at understandings which are merely 
reflections of my own subjective world.5 But I don’t want to be solipsistic; I don’t read 
poetry simply to exercise my skill at making meaning. Meaning is not something I want for 
its own sake; the meaning must be of something. I want to arrive at the literal meaning of 
the poem, to know what is being communicated, to know what the author is trying to say. 
My objection to the second puzzle model is not that it opens the doors to interpretive 
anarchy, that it precludes any agreement on a single meaning which will serve as a standard 
for all readers across the centuries. My objection is that it prevents me from arriving at a 
single meaning which I can believe as the literal meaning today. 
The division of labor Frye speaks of suggests that the notion of the literary work as 
a communication between the author and the reader is an illusion. If so, it would seem 
preferable to accept that fact than to remain in denial. If we cannot know what the author 
meant to say it seems pointless to go on trying, and our time would be better spent seeking 
more productive goals for our reading. What I suggest, however, is exactly the opposite. 
The reader can (and can only) preserve the communicative function of literature by 
repressing her knowledge of the division of labor between author and reader. As the reader, 
I am always inevitably participating in the construction of the meaning. But that 
participation is only successful to the extent that I remain unaware of it, that I can preserve 
the illusion that this is what the text says. Once that participation becomes self-conscious, I 
begin to suspect that my understanding is more a reflection of myself than it is of the poet. 
Coleridge spoke of a willing suspension of disbelief in that the reader agrees to accept the 
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conventions of literature and ignore the fact that the work constantly traverses the bounds 
of credulity. In order to invest emotionally in the work, we allow ourselves to be fooled into 
believing that people really speak this way and act this way. What I am suggesting is an 
extension of the same principle. In order to preserve the illusion that her understanding is 
the single meaning of the work, and thus that she is in communication with the author, the 
reader agrees to ignore her own contribution to the construction of that meaning. 
The willing suspension of disbelief may be demonstrated by my reading of Tate’s 
“Lewis and Clark Overheard in Conversation” (Selected 90; see Appendix). In this poem 
Tate takes a sledgehammer to the illusion that meaning is located in the poem, or that the 
poem embodies an intended meaning which can be communicated to a reader. Apart from 
the title, the text of the poem consists simply of 23 repetitions of the line “then we’ll get us 
some wine and spare ribs”. There is nothing terribly interesting about ‘the poem itself,’ and 
we can only imagine what Tate had in mind when he wrote it. But I can produce a 
compelling meaning from the raw material by locating the line within the context suggested 
by the title. The ostinato becomes a conversation between the famed explorers who, in the 
early years of the nineteenth century, led an expedition across the North American 
continent in search of an overland route to the Pacific. Sitting around the campfire after a 
long day on the trail, they do not mythologize themselves as the shapers of a great nation, 
nor fantasize about the glory and lucre that will surely befall them when they return. 
Instead, they dream of getting drunk and strapping on the feedbag. With the indelicate 
choice of repast, and the grammatical infelicity of “we’ll get us”, this is a conversation of 
giggling yokels which effectively deflates our romantic preconceptions of historical figures. 
Obviously, this meaning is not ‘in’ the text by any stretch of the imagination. The poem 
requires my active participation in the construction of meaning, but I understand this 
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meaning so immediately, so intuitively and un-self-consciously that I never doubt that it is 
the intended meaning of the poem.  
Rather than discovering the author’s intention, the reader constructs it. Although she 
constructs it, she is not aware that she does so, and takes her construction as the author’s 
intention. The construction of the author’s intention is nothing more than the construction 
of meaning, which is to say, nothing more than understanding the work: 
it seems obvious that the efforts of readers are always efforts to discern and 
therefore to realize (in the sense of becoming) an author’s intention. I would only 
object if that realization were conceived narrowly, as the single act of 
comprehending an author’s purpose, rather than (as I would conceive it) as the 
succession of acts readers perform in the continuing assumption that they are 
dealing with intentional beings. In this view discerning an intention is no more or 
less than understanding, and understanding includes (is constituted by) all the 
activities which make up what I call the structure of the reader’s experience. To 
describe that experience is therefore to describe the reader’s efforts at 
understanding, and to describe the reader’s efforts at understanding is to describe his 
realization (in two senses) of an author’s intention. (Fish 161) 
 
This notion of the author as a construction of the reader provides a practical route between 
the two puzzle models. On one hand, it sets limits for interpretation by preserving the 
illusion of an intended meaning. The reader cannot make the poem mean whatever she 
wants it to mean, because she is guided by the notion that an intended meaning exists. On 
the other hand, it prevents foreclosure on the meaning of the poem. Not only can the 
literary community not lay claim to any objectively ‘correct’ interpretation, but the reader 
herself will, over the course of a lifetime, pass through any number of interpretations, each 
different, each correct. This demands a certain duality of mind on the part of the reader: 
although she knows that there can be no objectively correct meaning, she pretends that 
there is one, and that she has found it.  
The question of what the author intended only becomes an issue when the reader 
encounters evidence of an intention that differs from her own construction. This evidence 
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may be gathered from the author’s letters or journal entries, or from a persuasive critic, 
professor or fellow reader. In this case, the meaning the reader privileges will be 
determined by her degree of commitment to the meaning she has already constructed. A 
reader who has intuitively realized a poem will, more than likely, be committed to that 
meaning, simply because she arrived at it so naturally, so un-self-consciously. She wouldn’t 
have understood the poem in this way if she didn’t believe this was the literal meaning; and 
the literal meaning of a poem is a difficult thing to part with. Her commitment to her 
understanding is tested, however, when she encounters intentional evidence, and she will 
have to make a decision to either maintain her understanding, modify it, or abandon it in 
favor of the more authoritative one. A reader who has only partly realized a poem may 
gratefully welcome intentional evidence, incorporating parts of the author’s (critic’s, 
professor’s) understanding into her own. If the reader finds the author’s understanding to be 
more meaningful than her own, she may even exchange her understanding for the author’s: 
this is simply a matter of ‘trading up,’ and it is difficult to maintain an ethical objection to 
the reader’s desire to get the maximum meaningfulness from the poem. It is difficult to 
believe, however, that a reader would exchange her own understanding for the author’s if 
she found the author’s understanding to be less meaningful than her own. It is always 
distressing to discover that the author’s understanding of her work is different from our 
own, because it destroys the illusion that reading is an act of communication. If the reader 
does find the author’s understanding to be less meaningful, nothing in theory prevents her 
from holding the author’s understanding and her own understanding as discrete categories. 
But to sacrifice her own rich understanding for the author’s comparatively narrow one is to 
trade the illusion of a meaningful communication for the reality of an unmeaningful 
communication. 
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What I am suggesting is not only that the author’s intention is always inevitably a 
construction of the reader. I am also suggesting that the author’s intention should be a 
construction of the reader. If the reader is to realize the poem, in the sense of the literal 
meaning (which is to say, the author’s intended meaning), that meaning must be something 
she is capable of realizing. Even if it were theoretically possible to determine the author’s 
actual intention, not everybody would be able to do it, because not everybody possesses the 
contexts of knowledge necessary for an independent construction of the author’s meaning. 
The reader may, of course, read some interview or journal excerpt in which the author 
reveals her intention. But even if the reader has this second-hand access to the author’s 
intention, nothing guarantees that she will be able to understand that intention. It may not 
be enough simply to have the intention explained to her: she herself may have to live 
through the necessary experiences and acquire the necessary contexts of knowledge. Rather 
than facilitating understanding, the discovery of intentional evidence can impede it, 
alienating the reader by revealing a ‘correct meaning’ which the reader simply cannot 
understand.  
One of the complications in using James’s “The Figure in the Carpet” as a vehicle 
for a discussion of intentionality is that James left behind considerable evidence which 
could be, and has been, construed as a statement of his intention in writing the tale. It must 
be a dilemma for any critic to decide whether or not it is tenable to use intentional evidence 
to interpret a tale which problematizes the use of intentional evidence. The Prefaces which 
James wrote for the 1908 New York Edition of his works have always posed difficulties for 
critics. One of the strongest weapons in the perennial debate over the existence of the 
ghosts in “The Turn of the Screw” is the Preface in which James describes the ghosts as 
“goblins, elves, imps, demons ... fairies of the legendary order, wooing their victims forth” 
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(Art 175). However, the usefulness of such evidence is dubious at best. In the Prefaces 
James mentions the waywardness of his original intentions and “the triumph of intentions 
never entertained” (Art 100). Frank Kermode claims, about the Preface to “The Figure in 
the Carpet”, that “When James speaks of the ‘intention’ of his work, he is not suggesting 
that there is some simply apprehensible design to which correct interpretation must exactly 
conform” (26). R.P. Blackmur is somewhat more blunt, saying that “James does nothing to 
help” in the Preface (204). Hana Wirth-Nesher notes the disparity between James’s 
statements in his preliminary notebook draft and his retrospective comments in the Preface, 
and wonders which represents James’s true intention (124-5).  
In a preliminary notebook draft of the tale, James’s novelist “doesn’t tell what [his 
general intention] is – it’s for the reader to find out. ‘It’s there – it’s there,’ he says; ‘I can’t 
– or I won’t – tell you what it is” (Notebooks 136). This information could potentially 
undermine the credibility of my reading of the tale, which takes for granted the fact that 
Vereker can’t tell the narrator what his general intention is; but the possibility that Vereker 
won’t tell the narrator is alluded to only in the notebooks and does not appear in the 
published version. Another difference between the two versions – which also threatens my 
reading -- is the equation which the novelist in the notebook draft draws between intention 
and meaning: the general intention “isn’t the ‘esoteric meaning,’ as the newspapers say: 
‘it’s the only meaning, it’s the very soul and core of the work’” (137). F.O. Matthiessen 
takes this last piece of evidence to affirm the importance of perceiving such general 
intentions: “The Figure in the Carpet” reminds critics “that their task is not fulfilled unless 
they have passed beyond the trees to the wood, and have seen an artist’s achievement in its 
entirety” (42). Matthiessen’s idea of what a general intention constitutes is worth 
examining, however. He suggests that a general intention may be found in James’s The 
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Wings of the Dove, in that James modeled the character of Milly Theale after his beloved 
cousin Minny Temple and intended the novel as an homage to her (42-3). It is only by 
reading James’s comments in his Preface and in Notes of a Son and Brother that 
Matthiessen can know this. This may be an interesting bit of information to the reader, and 
may add a certain richness to her understanding. But it seems foolish to claim that an 
intention which cannot be ascertained from the novel itself should constitute the meaning of 
The Wings of the Dove. 
In volume XV of the New York Edition “The Figure in the Carpet” is joined by four 
other tales of “the literary life” (Art 220). Notwithstanding James’s declaration that the five 
tales “testify indeed, as they thus stand together, to no general intention – they minister 
only, I think, to an emphasised effect” (221), critics continue to mine the Preface for 
evidence of his intention in writing “The Figure in the Carpet”. Frequently cited is James’s 
recollection of “the lively impulse ... to reinstate analytic appreciation, by some ironic or 
fantastic stroke, so far as possible, in its virtually forfeited rights and dignities” (228). The 
first question we must ask about this statement is whether James’s “impulse” – his 
motivation in writing the tale – is to be taken as the tale’s intended meaning. My impulse in 
making myself a sandwich may be that I am hungry, but if a friend shows up and I give the 
sandwich to her instead of eating it myself, does the sandwich thereby lose its meaning? No 
doubt my friend may appreciate the fact that I gave her a sandwich originally intended for 
myself, and my generosity may contribute to her enjoyment of the sandwich. But can we 
say that the meaning of the sandwich is only the fact that I intended to eat it, and not the 
fact that my friend finds it to be nutritious, delicious and satisfying? Even if my friend does 
not know that I intended to eat the sandwich -- if she presumes that I expected her arrival 
and prepared a lunch for her – has she failed to perceive the meaning of the sandwich?  
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Even if James’s impulse is to be taken as his intended meaning, his intended 
meaning is still not very clear. Did James intend to reinstate analytic criticism on Corvick’s 
part, did he see Corvick’s critical efforts as a reinstatement of analytic criticism to their 
rights and dignities? Did he see the narrator’s efforts as such a reinstatement? Or was his 
intention to reinstate analytic criticism on the part of the readers of “The Figure in the 
Carpet”, did he hope that, by writing such an ambiguous and complex tale, readers would 
be forced to pay close, analytic attention to his so carefully crafted work? If the latter, then, 
considering the immense volume of analytic appreciation the tale has received over the last 
hundred years, without a doubt his intention has been perceived, and with a vengeance. 
At the same time, intentional evidence provides useful information that could 
contribute to a richer understanding of the tale. In the Preface, James expresses his desire 
for good criticism and his general disappointment in the critics for missing “the intended 
sense of things” (Art 229). His sympathies seem to lie primarily with Vereker: he speaks of 
“the poor man’s attributive dependence, for the sense of being understood and enjoyed, on 
some responsive reach of critical perception that he is destined never to waylay with 
success” (228). In his Preface to “The Aspern Papers” James refers to Vereker as one of his 
“heroes and martyrs of the artistic ideal” (167). To ignore James’s intention as stated in the 
Preface clears the way for a univocal anti-intentional conclusion. It makes it easier to slight 
Vereker’s importance as a character and his interest in having his intentions perceived. It 
makes it easier to see Vereker’s invitation to the narrator as foolish, to see Corvick’s 
untimely death as the due price to pay for his hubris, to see the whole quest for the general 
intention as fundamentally misguided. Nevertheless, while the notebooks and Prefaces 
seem to suggest that James himself believed in the magnificence of Vereker’s general 
intention and approved of Corvick’s quest, his primary interest appears to have been in 
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dramatizing a situation rather than in judging his characters. This judgment is left for the 
reader: the tale simply “exhibits a small group of well-meaning persons engaged in a test. 
The reader is, on the evidence, left to conclude” (229).  
Should the reader avail herself of intentional evidence or not? One solution to this 
dilemma is suggested by Wimsatt and Beardsley’s discussion of Eliot’s notes to “The 
Waste Land.” The authors conclude that “whereas notes tend to seem to justify themselves 
as external indexes to the author’s intention, yet they ought to be judged like any other parts 
of a composition ... and when so judged their reality as parts of the poem ... may come into 
question” (IF 343). In effect, the notes an author provides as to her intention are 
incorporated into the poem, and, although they may “constitute special information about 
the meaning ... they ought to be subject to the same scrutiny as any of the other words” 
(342-3). This allowance is only made for cases in which the notes are published together 
with the poem, and the focus of scrutiny is on the structural integrity of the notes as parts of 
the poem. Any subsequent statement the author makes he makes as a critic, and his 
statement is to be granted no more authority than a statement by any other critic. Fish’s 
position on intentional evidence is similar, but rather than placing emphasis on the 
structural integrity of the evidence, he places emphasis on the effect such evidence will 
cause. Although Fish’s critical method does not depend upon a presumptive intention, he 
makes an exception for  
cases where the work includes a statement of intention ... which, because it 
establishes an expectation on the part of the reader, becomes a part of his 
experience. This of course does not mean that the stated intention is to be believed 
or used as the basis of an interpretation, simply that it, like everything else in the 
text, draws a response, and, like everything else, it must be taken into account. (51)  
 
Like Wimsatt and Beardsley, Fish makes allowances only in cases where intentional 
evidence is included as part of the work. I would extend this allowance to all intentional 
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evidence -- letters, journals, prefaces, notebooks and so forth -- for two important reasons. 
The first concerns the relative ‘fictionality’ of the evidence. If a statement of intention 
appears in the middle of a work, this statement is not made by the actual author per se, but 
by a fictionalized version of the author, a narrator or speaker. Even if the author intends her 
work as autobiographical or ‘non-fictional’ she is still subject to the conventions of literary 
interpretation; she is not free to speak as an outside authority from within the confines of 
the work. As the statement of intention is literally included in the work, there is no reason 
to assume that it is a statement of the author’s intention, rather than a statement made by a 
fictional voice posing as the author. Eliot’s notes to “The Waste Land”, however, though 
attached to the poem, are not, strictly speaking, included within the text of the poem. The 
reader sees them as ‘non-fictional’ in the sense that she presumes they are written by Eliot 
as representations of his actual intention. In this case, there would seem to be little 
difference between such non-fictional notes and any other non-fictional statement by the 
author. James’s Preface to “The Figure in the Carpet”, published twelve years after the 
original appearance of the tale, is no more subsequent to the tale than Eliot’s notes are 
subsequent to the text of “The Waste Land”: both Preface and notes refer to their respective 
texts in equal degrees, and both may be equally attended to, deferred to or ignored.  
The second reason I would extend the allowance to all types of intentional evidence 
is purely pragmatic. It is reasonable enough that a reader who does not feel that the author’s 
intention is relevant will not feel compelled to search for intentional evidence. But a reader 
may unwittingly stumble across such evidence, and once she has, that evidence is very 
difficult to ignore. An author’s statements about her own intention can be extremely 
persuasive, and if the reader hopes to maintain her own understanding she will need a 
firmer theoretical ground to stand on than the simple insistence that ‘this evidence is not to 
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be attended to.’ Such insistence is really rather defensive. There is no reason to 
categorically disregard the author’s intention if the reader has confidence in her own ability 
to construct meaning and is able to withstand the author’s authority. There should be 
nothing terribly threatening about intentional evidence -- a knowledge of the author’s 
notebooks or prefaces is simply more knowledge, and the reader may or may not find that 
knowledge useful in her understanding of the work.  
Although to the best of my knowledge Tate has written nothing specifically on his 
“The Figure in the Carpet”, his interviews and critical writings may be construed as 
evidence of a ‘general intention’ in his poetic oeuvre. As with James, rather than providing 
solutions, this evidence only leaves more information to be sifted and assessed. In an essay 
which bears a certain resemblance to a Jamesian Preface, Tate reconstructs the process 
through which he wrote the poem “A Box for Tom”, recalling his original ‘impulse’ and 
demonstrating a predominant concern with problems of technique (Route 120-6). His 
intention does not seem to have been determined beforehand, but to have evolved 
simultaneously with the process of composition: “When I started the poem I wasn’t sure 
where it would go” (123). His compositional decisions seem to have been largely intuitive, 
geared less towards capturing any preconceived ‘content’ than in creating a sustained 
mood: “sound was playing a sizeable role in the choices that had to be made within this 
poem”; the word ‘dogshit’ was eliminated because it sounded too “tough” (125). In an 
interesting passage, Tate suggests that his intentions are not referential in any sense: 
when you’re writing you’re not thinking about who is going to read what you’re 
writing. You’re thinking about how you’re going to get out of this jam, or 
something as corny as how wonderful life is with all its mysteries and riddles. 
Because most poems of any value do posit paradoxes, paraphrasing is a 
feeble pursuit. Because they are conveyed in images, you have little of importance 
when you strip them away: Life is sad, Life is beautiful – that’s not saying anything. 
(125) 
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Although the poet is thinking “how wonderful life is” as he writes his poem, he cannot 
simply say that. Such magnificent understandings cannot be adequately expressed in 
referential language -- to actually say “Life is beautiful” is “not saying anything”. 
Like James, Tate testifies to his original intentions going awry in the process of 
composition: “you go to your desk with the intention of writing a suicide note and end up 
writing the funniest piece you’ve ever written ... I know very few poets who are masters of 
their intentions. That’s what keeps it exciting and makes poets so unreliable” (Route 61). 
Tate raises an important point here. Poets are “unreliable” in the sense that, unlike 
journalists, they are not committed to faithfully representing what they ‘really think’ or 
‘really feel’ (in “Read the Great Poets” (Selected 146-7) Tate’s speaker complains that 
“People read poems like newspapers”). They do not necessarily intend to capture an 
emotional state or ideational content, but to create new emotional states or contents through 
the arrangement of language. This recalls Eliot’s notion of impersonality, discussed in the 
Introduction. It also recalls I.A. Richards’s distinction between two types of poetic 
language: poets do not necessarily use language for the sake of its truth value, for its 
referential function, but for the sake of the effect produced by language, its emotive 
function.  
Many readers have a tendency to treat any statement as referential, probably 
because they themselves generally tend to ‘mean’ what they say. Such readers may have 
difficulty perceiving irony, because it never occurs to them that the author or speaker does 
not ‘really mean’ what she says; irony may even strike them as a kind of social 
irresponsibility. It is neither uncommon nor especially difficult to say things without 
meaning them in the referential sense: I can say “I hate myself and want to die” a hundred 
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times and it still won’t even approach being true. And yet, there is a kind of truth to my 
remark, in that, although I do not really want to die, I really do like to make flippant, 
provocative remarks of this kind. In this case language ‘means’ in the function it serves, 
without ‘meaning’ in the sense of having any truth value. The remark is intended in its 
emotive function rather than in its referential function.  
Readers, however, frequently make the mistake of portioning some utterances into 
the emotive category and others into the referential category by judging the tenability of the 
utterance’s truth value. For example, If I say to my girlfriend “Yesterday I bit the head off a 
duck,” she will, most likely, immediately understand my utterance in its emotive function. 
But if I say “I hate myself and want to die” she is highly likely to take the utterance as 
referential, and it may take a whole lot of convincing before she is willing to accept it as 
being just as emotive as the first utterance. Both utterances are, of course, equally untrue. 
But my girlfriend may say, in regards to my second utterance, “Even if it isn’t entirely true, 
you must have meant it a little bit, or else you wouldn’t have said it.” But why wouldn’t I 
have said it? I said that I bit the head off a duck, and that was not true, not even a little bit. 
My girlfriend makes a good point, of course, in that she knows that I know that the second 
comment would hurt her, and she knows that I would probably not be so callous as to make 
such a comment unless I did in fact mean something by it. Poets, however, although they 
may have audiences, publishers and censorship bureaus to consider, are largely free from 
the responsibility with language that I am required to have if I expect to continue having a 
girlfriend. Poets can say whatever they want, and are always free to disclaim the truth value 
of whatever they say, although they may not always be taken at their word.  
Tate’s ‘unreliability,’ his refusal (or constitutional inability, as the case may be) to 
articulate a referential intention in referential language, has not gone without “inciting 
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critical puzzlement” (Upton 104), and has frequently resulted in charges of obscurity.6 In a 
generally favorable review, Dana Gioia cites Tate’s “habitual avoidance of logical 
structure, his aversion to psychological realism, and his instinctive denial of conventional 
meaning” as contributing to his conclusion that “Whatever deeper meaning the poems have 
– if, indeed, they do cohere at a deeper level – remains largely inaccessible to the reader” 
(79). Such charges are apparently widespread enough for Tate to feel compelled to defend 
himself: “I don’t intend ... for the poems to be cryptic or obscure at all. I don’t want the 
reader to be lost for a second, but on the other hand the externals of the poem are only the 
tip of what the poem is trying to suggest. I think it’s the reader’s luxury to fill in the rest of 
the text” (Route 160).  
The reader, of course, may not want to fill in the rest of the text, and rather than 
viewing Tate’s poems as invitations to the construction of meaning, she may simply regard 
them as being carelessly obscure. The charge of obscurity against any poet is fundamentally 
misguided in that it presumes that what the poet means to say may be expressed in a clearer 
way than she has done. A poet, one presumes, is not a cryptographer or practical jokester: if 
she could have expressed herself in a clearer way, she would have done so. As Tate 
demonstrates through his analysis of “A Box for Tom”, poets are always seeking the best 
way to say what they mean; and if the poet publishes the poem, we can only assume that 
she feels she has reasonably succeeded in doing so. Readers find a poem obscure either 
because they have failed to wheedle a referential meaning from it, or because they have 
succeeded in doing so, in which case the language of the poem will seem needlessly 
obscure in comparison to the clear, unambiguous referential meaning. “The Figure in the 
Carpet” is only an obscure poem if we expect it to mean something like “poets are 
pretentious” or “literary critics are jackals” (similarly, the charges of ambiguity levied 
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against James’s tale result from the difficulty of making such referential statements about 
its meaning). If, however, we expect the poem to resist its own meaning, to impede our 
efforts to reduce it to a referential meaning, then the poem is not obscure at all: in fact, it 
points to this meaning quite clearly. In this sense it is the reader who makes the poem 
obscure, rather than the poet.  
A poem is never obscure in itself. If it is obscure to some readers, it is always clear 
to others. Those to whom it is clear will fault the others for being dense; those to whom it is 
obscure will fault the others for reading too much into it. By the same token, there is no 
such thing as an easy or a difficult poem. It may seem like a truism to say that while 
everyone can understand The Catcher in the Rye, only a few can understand Ulysses. But 
what if the reader has so ‘outgrown’ works like The Catcher in the Rye that when she reads 
it, rather than having a meaningful experience, she is just bored, and cannot understand 
what all the fuss is about? Can we not say that she has failed to understand the work? It 
may strike some as being elitist, but understanding a work of literature will always be a 
matter of just simply ‘getting’ it. This does not imply any kind of literary competence – the 
ability to ‘get’ a work would only imply that reader’s competence for that work.  
I do not get Tate’s poem. Although I have succeeded in producing a meaning for it, 
I cannot say that I find this meaning to be particularly meaningful. While Tate’s “The 
Figure in the Carpet” puts me through interesting interpretive gestures and forces me to 
consider urgent questions about literary meaning, it is these gestures and questions which I 
find meaningful, rather than the poem which occasions them. Once these gestures and 
questions have been occasioned, I find very little reason to actually read the poem: it 
affords none of the sensual delight of “The Emperor of Ice Cream”, none of the emotional 
appeal of “Easter 1916”. An exaggerated instance of the same principle is “Lewis and Clark 
 104 
Overheard in Conversation”: although it is a delightful poem once I have produced it, there 
is very little to read at all (does anyone read all 23 lines of this poem?) Once the poem has 
been seen it has been consumed as a work (there is no need to see the poem again) and 
henceforth exists solely as a Text. The experience of meaning is no longer something that 
occurs simultaneously with the act of reading the poem: it can occur anywhere at any time.  
But whereas I enjoy the meaning I produce from “Lewis and Clark”, I do not enjoy 
the meaning I produce from “The Figure in the Carpet”. All work and no Text may indeed 
make Jack a dull boy, but all Text and no work, in this case at least, do not make for a 
particularly meaningful reading experience. In the end, I can only say that I do not like this 
poem. This may seem impossibly subjective and unscientific, but I will argue that all 
literary judgments are rendered in this fashion. There is no other way to render them: if the 
reader constructs both the text and the author’s intention, there can be no objective standard 
for literary judgments, and the only thing I can determine is whether or not it meets my own 
subjective criteria for a successful poem. If a poem succeeds because it works, as Wimsatt 
and Beardsley maintain, then any poem can be successful if the reader makes it work, if she 
makes it speak toward an intention. For all the alleged objectivity of the New Critics, it is 
not difficult to imagine that their evaluations were based upon a predisposition to the poem, 
that they made work the poems they wanted to work, and made not work the poems they 
did not want to work.  
The reader has a choice as to whether or not she will make the poem work. I could 
just as easily have discarded Tate’s poem, after a few readings, as obscure rubbish. But I 
continued to think about it, to give it the opportunity to justify itself, and I did this because 
of a certain obligation to articulate an understanding of the poem. I do not have this 
obligation with the majority of poems that I read, and so whether or not I give the poem the 
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opportunity to justify itself must depend upon some other factor, which I suggest is nothing 
more than an initial predisposition to the poem. James says that “The only obligation for 
which in advance we may hold a novel ... is that it be interesting” (LC1 49), and while this 
again may seem impossibly unscientific, it is accurate, and it provides more than sufficient 
reason for reading a book. If I find a novel or a poem interesting on the first reading, I will 
read it a second time, and if I still like it, I will read it a third time. The more times I read it, 
the more I will find in it. The more I find in it, the more likely I am to make it work, to 
make it speak towards an intention. If it does so, I will judge it a successful poem.  
Literary works do not have meanings. Authors do not intend to say things -- they 
say them. All we can presume about an author’s intention is that she intended to write the 
work she wrote. At the same time, literary works can be meaningful in the most profound 
sense of the word. The reader does not search for meaningfulness -- she either finds it or 
she doesn’t. If she continues to read literary works, we can only assume she finds them 
meaningful: it is difficult to imagine that she would go on performing a meaningless 
exercise. Whether she derives this meaningfulness from the author’s intention, from the 
poem itself, or from a possibly ineffable experience, the end result is pleasure. Assuming 
that a primary function of literature is to give pleasure, finding that pleasure would itself be 
a justification for reading, and consequently, what the reader perceives as the sources of her 
pleasure would be a not-inappropriate focus for literary criticism.    
                                                 
1
 These terms were introduced by the structural linguist Ferdinand de Saussure. The signifier is “a sound-
image, or its graphic equivalent”; the signified is “the concept or meaning” evoked by the signifier. “The three 
black marks c-a-t are a signifier which evoke the signified ‘cat’ in an English mind” (Eagleton 96). 
 
2
 A cognitive realization is not to be confused with the painstaking mental effort required to make sense of a 
difficult work, the line-by-line construction of what the words mean. In such a case, the reader may quite 
likely reach an intuitive understanding once the semantic sense has been ascertained. 
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3
 This quotation is from a blurb by Philip Lewis on the back cover of Michael Riffaterre’s Semiotics of 
Poetry: “Riffaterre’s readings, sometimes dealing with texts that are exceedingly resistant to interpretation, 
constitute a veritable gold mine.” 
 
4
 Joyce’s schematic for Ulysses, including his working chapter titles, was first revealed in Gilbert’s James 
Joyce’s Ulysses. The published criticism generally refers to Joyce’s chapters by these titles, although the titles 
do not appear in the novel itself. 
 
5
 It could be argued that discourse-based understandings are equally solipsistic in that the reader, rather than 
trying to understand the unique language of the poem, imposes a language that represents conceptual 
paradigms with which she is already familiar. The understanding produced is undoubtedly social; but the 
poem, rather than challenging the reader’s perception of the world, simply reaffirms it. 
 
6
 For an assortment of scathing remarks on Tate’s work, see Gioia 76 and Upton 104. 
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APPENDIX A 
“With a Child All Day” by James Tate 
 
Little ragamuffin, brat, a craving for Sen-Sen 
as we walked along the Académie; 
it is all that interests you. 
I remain quiet and my manner annoys you; 
I’m present and unaccounted for. 
The tunnels are not crowded in this part of the city. 
 
Finally I say I like dogs, possible dogs, worn thin. 
 
We’re in the wrong place, our favorite season. 
Ill luck has surfaced again and you do as you please. 
I hang on to you around the corner. 
There is something lacking even now. 
Come, whitewash my fasting worth. 
 
Something living touched me; a plant? 
You pretend to recognize old friends. 
Why this embarrassed despair, this recoiling? 
City of Love – I can’t breathe. 
 
Our own God gave us, gave us the bird. 
 
Goodbye. 
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APPENDIX B 
“The Figure in the Carpet” by James Tate 
 
Even the abandoned husk of a person can sometimes 
perform useful tasks and enjoy mildly good times, 
light opera, dusting for cobwebs with long brooms, etc. 
We walk a little, pause, look down, walk. 
It’s not a big effort to do any of this. 
It’s not as though we were crossing the forbidden 
territory of Lop against icy gales, 
but we would like to know what is on our minds— 
a maze?—when we organize these shadows— 
a slumber party?—so seductively, and yet  
     incomprehensibly, 
until we can’t find ourselves anymore, 
those selves that have been following us 
and pestering us all these years, 
which is not necessarily a bad thing. 
Oh, you talk a good game, Binky. I can see 
that you have a nervous system shaped like Florida. 
A lot of good that will do you when it’s time 
to trace your steps back into the egg. 
Did I say egg? I meant dog. 
If there are no secrets to be revealed 
then I shall resume darning my other sock. 
And if there are they best be espied 
over at Binky’s place, his rotunda has a view of some. 
And then when we walk back it won’t follow us. 
We won’t even remember its name 
but our next big tag sale will be ablaze with bargain incubators. 
And that’s all I asked for was a clue. 
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APPENDIX C 
“Lewis and Clark Overheard in Conversation” by James Tate 
 
 
then we’ll get us some wine and spare ribs 
then we’ll get us some wine and spare ribs 
then we’ll get us some wine and spare ribs 
then we’ll get us some wine and spare ribs 
then we’ll get us some wine and spare ribs 
then we’ll get us some wine and spare ribs 
then we’ll get us some wine and spare ribs 
then we’ll get us some wine and spare ribs 
then we’ll get us some wine and spare ribs 
then we’ll get us some wine and spare ribs 
then we’ll get us some wine and spare ribs 
then we’ll get us some wine and spare ribs 
then we’ll get us some wine and spare ribs 
then we’ll get us some wine and spare ribs 
then we’ll get us some wine and spare ribs 
then we’ll get us some wine and spare ribs 
then we’ll get us some wine and spare ribs 
then we’ll get us some wine and spare ribs 
then we’ll get us some wine and spare ribs 
then we’ll get us some wine and spare ribs 
then we’ll get us some wine and spare ribs 
then we’ll get us some wine and spare ribs 
then we’ll get us some wine and spare ribs 
 
 
